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This Article adds to the burgeoning literature that explores the various collateral
consequences that attach to criminal convictions in the United States. These consequences include ineligibility for public and government-assisted housing, public
benefits, and various forms of employment, as well as civic exclusions such as ineligibility for jury service and disenfranchisement. This Article argues that decisionmakers in the United States failed to foresee the collective impact of these
consequences when they expanded them dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s. They
also failed to account for the disproportionate impact these consequences would
have on individuals and communities of color. To provide a broader context for
studying the United States’ imposition of collateral consequences and the extent to
which these consequences are rooted in race, this Article looks to England, Canada,
and South Africa. These countries, which have criminal justice systems similar to
the United States’ and have similar histories of disproportionately incarcerating
people of color, have in recent years adopted criminal justice practices similar to
those of the United States and have turned to increasingly punitive punishment
schemes. This Article is the first to offer a detailed comparative examination of
collateral consequences and finds that the consequences in the United States are
harsher and more pervasive than the consequences in these other countries. It also
shows that Canada and South Africa have articulated broad protections for the
dignity interests of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals that are
influenced by human rights notions of rights and privileges. Canada, in particular,
has employed mechanisms to ease racial disparities in incarceration. Drawing lessons from these countries, this Article offers steps the United States should take to
ease the legal burdens placed on individuals with criminal records, as well as to
lessen the disproportionate impact these post-sentence consequences have on individuals and communities of color.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has the world’s highest incarceration rate.1
While the United States has five percent of the world’s population,
nearly twenty-five percent of the world’s prisoners are behind the bars
of its prisons and jails.2 The road to this astonishing incarceration rate
began nearly three decades ago with the “war on drugs” and “tough
on crime” movements of the 1980s and 1990s.3 These movements led
to dramatically increased incarceration of individuals for nonviolent
offenses—especially nonviolent drug offenses—and longer sentences.4
Three decades after its incarceration explosion began, the United
States is now experiencing a post-incarceration crisis: Record numbers
of individuals—recently eclipsing 700,000 per year—are now exiting
U.S. correctional facilities and returning to communities across the
country.5 These individuals must confront a wide range of collateral
consequences stemming from their convictions, including ineligibility
for federal welfare benefits, public housing, student loans, and
employment opportunities, as well as various forms of civic exclusion,
such as ineligibility for jury service and felon disenfranchisement.6 As
1 THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN 2008, at 5 (2008),
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-1-1_
FORWEB.pdf.
2 PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (2009); see also
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 6 (2007) (“[T]he portion of the population held in custody for crimes [in the U.S.] has grown well beyond historic norms.”).
3 MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND
ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 1 (2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf (“The ‘war on drugs,’ officially declared in the
early 1980s, has been a primary contributor to the enormous growth of the prison system in
the United States during the last quarter-century . . . .”).
4 See infra notes 312–13.
5 WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PUB. NO. NCJ-228417, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2008, at 4 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf (noting that 735,454 sentenced prisoners
were released from state and federal prisons in 2008).
6 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS, introductory cmt. (2004) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE], available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
standards/collateralsanctionwithcommentary.pdf (describing various types of collateral
consequences); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-offender
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a result, “[w]ith a criminal record comes official state certification of
an individual’s criminal transgressions; a wide range of social, economic, and political privileges become off-limits.”7
Scholars from several fields have explored the contours of these
consequences. Criminal justice actors, bar associations, and law school
programs have all sought to understand the full extent and scope of
these consequences;8 attorneys in some jurisdictions have addressed
the possibility that these consequences will attach by informing clients
about them and negotiating plea agreements that take such consequences into consideration;9 and lawmakers have recently called for
the examination of these consequences.10
Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 258 (2004) (same). An emerging parallel issue involves
various court-related monetary obligations that states are increasingly imposing against
individuals with criminal records. These financial costs of punishment include court fees,
probation or parole fees, and fees for needed services such as drug and alcohol treatment.
In many instances, individuals cannot afford to pay these fees because they do not have
full-time employment. See REBEKAH DILLER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
MARYLAND’S PAROLE SUPERVISION FEE: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 12–13 (2009), available
at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/publications/MD.Fees.Fines.pdf (explaining that
most parolees in Maryland do not pay forty-dollar monthly parole fee and that those
parolees who are unemployed are less likely to pay it). These debts can lead to civil judgments, negative credit reports, and wage garnishment. See id. at 19–20 (discussing these
effects on Maryland parolees).
7 DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 33 (2007); see also Stephen C. Richards & Richard S. Jones, Beating the
Perpetual Incarceration Machine: Overcoming Structural Impediments to Re-entry, in
AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 201, 204
(Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004) (discussing how collateral consequences of
incarceration, including “disabilities, disqualifications and legal restriction[s],” impact
reentry).
8 See, e.g., CIVIL ACTION PROJECT, THE BRONX DEFENDERS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK STATE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AND OTHER ADVOCATES FOR PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS (2007),
http://www.reentry.net/public2/library/item.90615; N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, RE-ENTRY AND
REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO PUBLIC SAFETY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
(2006), http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Substantive_Reports&
TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=11415; T HE REENTRY OF
EX-OFFENDERS CLINIC, UNIV. OF MD. SCHOOL OF LAW, A REPORT ON THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN MARYLAND 3–6 (2007), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/cc_report2007.pdf; WASH. DEFENDER
ASS’N, BEYOND THE CONVICTION: WHAT DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN WASHINGTON STATE
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COLLATERAL AND OTHER NON-CONFINEMENT CONSEQUENCES
OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2007), http://www.defensenet.org/resources/publications-1/
beyond-the-conviction/Beyond%20the%20Conviction%20-Updated%20-%202007.pdf.
9 See McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s
Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479,
494–96 (2005) (describing innovative ways in which criminal defense organization The
Bronx Defenders seeks to educate prosecutors and judges about collateral consequences).
10 See Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.). In part, the Second Chance Act reauthorizes
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These actors generally recognize that the problem of postconviction collateral consequences is rapidly becoming more severe for three
interrelated reasons. First, collateral consequences have increased in
number, scope, and severity since the 1980s.11 Second, record numbers
of individuals are now exiting U.S. correctional facilities.12 Finally,
collateral consequences hinder reentry and exacerbate the risks of
recidivism; in fact, most individuals will be rearrested within three
years of release.13
This Article seeks to explore the unforeseen aftereffects of this
explosion of collateral consequences in the United States: the extent
to which these consequences frustrate the ability of individuals with
criminal convictions to reintegrate into their communities, move past
their legal transgressions, and lead productive post-incarceration lives.
This exploration reveals the extent to which the United States failed
to foresee the collective weight of these consequences, which are now
having a pernicious impact on individuals with criminal records, their
families, and their communities.
To provide a broader context for the extent to which the federal,
state, and local jurisdictions in the United States impose collateral
consequences on individuals with criminal records, this Article compares some of these consequences to those that are imposed in other
countries. While the scholarly literature on collateral consequences is
expanding, no one has yet undertaken a comprehensive comparative
local and state reentry demonstration projects that serve both incarcerated and released
adults and juveniles. Id. § 101(a). It also authorizes the Attorney General to award grants
to organizations that apply to set up and manage these projects. Id. § 101(d)–(e). However,
the Attorney General can only award a grant if the organization, inter alia, “provides a
plan for analysis of the statutory, regulatory, rules-based, and practice-based hurdles to
reintegration of offenders into the community.” Id. § 101(e)(4).
11 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, introductory cmt. (“The collateral consequences of conviction have been increasing steadily in variety and severity for
the past 20 years . . . .”); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 673–74 (2008) (noting that collateral consequences have
“greatly expanded in recent years” and “now apply to relatively minor criminal convictions, and even to certain noncriminal convictions”).
12 Thompson, supra note 6, at 256 (“The United States has commenced the largest
multi-year discharge of prisoners from state and federal custody in history.”); see also Alec
C. Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in American
Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145, 145 (2008) (observing that
record numbers of individuals being released from incarceration each year have drawn
attention to collateral consequences).
13 PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ-193427, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
rpr94.pdf (finding that, in study of fifteen states, approximately two-thirds of individuals
released in 1994 were rearrested within three years).
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approach to these consequences that examines both their harshness
and their permanence. This Article attempts to do so by examining
collateral consequences in England and Wales,14 Canada, and South
Africa (the “Comparison Countries”). The Comparison Countries and
the United States share similar criminal justice systems, similar concerns about increasing crime, and similar histories of racial marginalization (or of disproportionately incarcerating racial minorities).15 The
Comparison Countries have also adopted criminal punishment practices similar to those of the United States.16
Many lawyers and courts in the United States recognize the relevance and utility of comparative perspectives when litigating and
interpreting constitutional issues.17 These perspectives are also meaningful in the collateral consequences context, providing a broader
framework to inform the policy debates about the purposes and
effects of collateral consequences. This Article will therefore analyze
how the Comparison Countries deal with their reentering populations,
focusing on the extent to which these countries impose legal barriers
that hinder successful reentry. As detailed below, the comparative
analysis illustrates that U.S. policies on collateral consequences are
harsher and more permanent than those in other countries.18 In particular, the comparative examination shows that the United States is
less forgiving of individuals with criminal records than are the
Comparison Countries.19 Thus, a comparative analysis of collateral
consequences enables more critical analysis of U.S. policies, which
14 Although they are distinct countries within the United Kingdom, England and Wales
have an integrated legal and penal system. MICHAEL CAVADINO & JAMES DIGNAN, PENAL
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 75 n.1 (2006). For convenience, the remainder of
this Article will simply refer to both England and Wales as “England.”
15 See infra Part I.D. (examining similarities between Comparison Countries and
United States).
16 See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text (describing instances where
Comparison Countries have adopted policies that are similar to those adopted by United
States).
17 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2003) (advocating
reference to international documents and laws of other nations when interpreting U.S.
Constitution). But see Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, U.S. Supreme Court,
U.S. Association of Constitutional Law Discussion at American University Washington
College of Law: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005),
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F2
38/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0 (discussing utility of comparative law, with
Justice Scalia stating that he does “not use foreign law in the interpretation of the United
States Constitution,” and Justice Breyer responding that “for years people all over the
world have cited the Supreme Court, why don’t we cite them occasionally?”).
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part II.B.
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may encourage U.S. decisionmakers at the state and federal levels to
adopt alternative ways of dealing with our reentering population.20
Comparative analysis can also enhance our understanding of the
differential impact of criminal justice policies on different social
groups. This Article examines the types of collateral consequences
imposed by the Comparison Countries—which all have histories of
racial marginalization—and also analyzes how two of these countries
have recognized the differential impact of their collateral consequence
policies on different ethnic and racial groups. Based on this comparison, this Article argues that the severity of collateral consequences in
the United States is rooted in racial marginalization and the narrow
dignity interests afforded to individuals with criminal records in the
United States.
This Article’s comparative analysis will help challenge the view
that the disproportionate incarceration of people of color in the
United States—specifically African Americans and Latinos—is a
function of patterns of crime and law enforcement and not the result
of racialized policies.21 A natural corollary to this view is that collateral consequences disproportionately impact people of color because
of these patterns and not because of racially targeted policies.
This Article will illustrate the extent to which the racialized
aspects of the U.S. criminal justice system have been ignored. It will
explore the racial overtones of the felon disenfranchisement laws that
have historically attended criminal convictions, as well as the racial
undertones of the other collateral consequence policies adopted in the
20 See infra Part IV. J. David Hirschel and William Wakefield have discussed the role of
comparative analysis in facilitating domestic reform. See J. DAVID HIRSCHEL & WILLIAM
WAKEFIELD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (1995) (“Until
one looks at another system there is always a tendency to take one’s own system for
granted, to assume that the way it operates is either the best or the only way for it to
work.”); see also Mathieu Deflem & Amanda J. Swygart, Comparative Criminal Justice, in
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 51, 52 (M.A. DuPont-Morales et al.
eds., 2001) (“In comparing different but related systems of criminal justice, researchers
often suggest how one system can learn from the other.”).
21 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW 3 (2001),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm (concluding that disproportionate number of minority defendants in federal capital cases “is not [due to] racial
or ethnic bias, but the representation of minorities in the pool of potential federal capital
cases”); cf. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA, at viii (1995) (arguing that “racial differences in patterns of offending, not racial
bias by police and other officials, are the principal reason that such greater proportions of
blacks than whites are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned” but that “cynical
policies of the Bush and Reagan administrations, and not racial differences in patterns of
offending, are the principal reason that racial disparities in the justice system steadily worsened after 1980”).
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1980s and 1990s as part of the “war on drugs” and “tough on crime”
movements.22 These policies have interacted with dramatically
increased incarceration rates to disproportionately impact individuals
and communities of color in ways that legislators and policymakers
have failed to recognize.
By contrast, two of the Comparison Countries, Canada and South
Africa, have significantly better records of recognizing the disparate
impact of their criminal justice policies. For example, Canada has recognized both the historic and contemporary discrimination against
Aborigines in its criminal justice system and has taken legislative steps
to lessen racial disparities in incarceration.23 These concerns about
disparate impact were relevant to the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision to strike down Canada’s prisoner disenfranchisement law in
2002.24 Similarly, the South African Constitutional Court, in its 2005
decision striking down South Africa’s prisoner disenfranchisement
law, pointed to historic disenfranchisement policies that denied voting
rights to the majority of South Africans.25
The comparative perspective also illustrates the extent to which
other countries, particularly Canada and South Africa, think about
their criminal justice policies in the broader human rights context of
preserving the dignity of individuals with criminal records. The highest
courts in both Canada and South Africa have recently extended
voting rights to sentenced prisoners. The Canadian Supreme Court’s
decision, in particular, declared disenfranchisement to be inconsistent
with the dignity interests of all incarcerated individuals.26 Similarly,
the concept of dignity is a core principle of South Africa’s
Constitution and post-apartheid jurisprudence.27
As detailed below, these broad notions of dignity stand in stark
contrast to the narrow dignity interests afforded prisoners and individuals with criminal records in the United States.28 This Article asserts
that the United States’ harsh collateral consequences, particularly
22

See infra Part III.B.1.a.
See infra notes 351–54 and accompanying text (describing statute requiring special
judicial attention to Aboriginal status and Supreme Court assertion that such attention is
necessary because Aboriginal offenders’ circumstances are unique).
24 See infra note 357 and accompanying text (discussing Sauvé v. Canada (Chief
Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.)).
25 See infra notes 359–60 and accompanying text (discussing Minister of Home Affairs v
National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO), 2005
(3) SA 280 (CC) (S. Afr.)).
26 See infra notes 238–41, 357 and accompanying text (discussing Sauvé v. Canada,
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 519).
27 See infra notes 254–57 and accompanying text (discussing S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2,
s. 10, and NICRO, 2005 (3) SA 280).
28 See infra notes 373–88 and accompanying text.
23
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those that are unrelated to the underlying crime, continue to degrade
individuals once they have completed their sentences.
Part I explains the need for a comparative examination of collateral consequences, noting that much of the available scholarship is
either outdated or too narrow in scope. It then introduces the connections among race, dignity, and collateral consequences in the United
States and sets out the various obstacles to comparative examination
of these consequences. Last, it explains why England, Canada, and
South Africa were selected for comparative study and gives an overview of criminal justice trends in each of these countries.
Part II describes collateral consequences in the United States and
the Comparison Countries. Rather than providing an exhaustive
account of these consequences—essentially an impossible feat—Part
II will focus on consequences related to housing, public benefits,
employment, and voting. The comparative findings illustrate that individuals with criminal records in the United States confront a broader
and more severe array of collateral consequences, and are therefore
more legally stigmatized, than similarly situated individuals in
England, Canada, and South Africa. These findings also illustrate that
both criminal convictions and their long-reaching effects are more permanent in the United States than in the Comparison Countries.
Part III attempts to explain why the United States particularly
relies on these consequences. It examines and rejects several possible
explanations, and then embraces two more persuasive explanations:
(1) U.S. collateral consequences are extensions of historic and contemporary criminal justice policies that target racial minorities or that
systematically ignore the disproportionate impact of these policies on
racial minorities; and (2) the United States affords narrow dignity
interests to incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals.
Part IV argues that decisionmakers should draw lessons from the
Comparison Countries when assessing both the extent to which collateral consequences impact the lives of individuals with criminal records
and the efficacy of these consequences as they are currently imposed.
It then offers potential reform measures.
I
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
A. The Need for a Comparative Examination
of Collateral Consequences
Scholars from many disciplines have compared various aspects of
the U.S. criminal justice system with other systems, particularly those
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of European countries.29 For example, scholars have given particularly
close scrutiny to the dramatic increase in U.S. incarceration rates
during the 1980s and have compared these rates to those of other
countries to illustrate the extent to which the United States relies on
incarceration.30 Many of these commentators have concluded that the
United States is more punitive than comparable Western
democracies.31
However, scholars have not yet thoroughly compared the network of collateral consequences currently employed in the United
States to those in other countries. The few comparisons that do exist
in this area are either outdated or relatively limited in the number of
countries and types of collateral consequences compared. The most
thorough survey of collateral consequences across countries—a seminal article by Mirjan Damaska32—is now over forty years old and
does not include the United States in its sample.33 Thus, it does not
account for recent U.S. policies stemming from the “war on drugs”
and the “tough on crime” movements. More recently, in 1997, an
article by Andrew von Hirsh and Martin Wasik provided a short discussion of different types of collateral consequences in England and
the United States as a prelude to a longer normative analysis of collateral consequences.34 However, even this more recent study predated
29

See, e.g., SHAUN L. GABBIDON, RACE, ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND JUSTICE: AN INTERDILEMMA (2010) (comparing justice systems in United States, Canada,
Australia, South Africa, and Great Britain from criminology perspective); MICHAEL
TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 116–17, 124–26 (1996) (comparing use of nonincarcerative
forms of punishment in United States, Germany, Netherlands, and England); Joe
Foweraker & Roman Krznaric, Differentiating the Democratic Performance of the West, 42
EUR. J. POL. RES. 313, 328–32 (2003) (comparing treatment of minorities by criminal justice systems in United States, United Kingdom, and Canada from political science perspective); David Jacobs & Richard Kleban, Political Institutions, Minorities, and Punishment: A
Pooled Cross-National Analysis of Imprisonment Rates, 82 SOC. FORCES 725 (2003) (comparing effects of corporatist and federalist political institutions on incarceration rates from
sociology perspective).
30 See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 13–15
(2006) (noting that extent of incarceration in United States is “unusual by international
standards” and that U.S. incarceration rate was five times higher than Britain’s in 2001);
Foweraker & Krznaric, supra note 29, at 328 (“From 1985 to 1995, the incarceration rate in
the U.S. increased from 313 to 600 per 100,000 people (a rise of 92 per cent), whereas there
was little or no change in the United Kingdom, Australia or . . . countries like Denmark
and the Netherlands.”).
31 See sources cited supra note 30.
32 Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal:
A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347 (1968) (surveying
collateral consequences in several countries, including Canada, France, Greece, Israel,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia).
33 Id. at 437.
34 Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A
Suggested Conceptual Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 601–04 (1997).
NATIONAL
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the dramatic expansion of collateral consequences in the late 1990s.
Other recent comparisons have generally focused only on a single particular collateral consequence such as felon disenfranchisement
instead of looking at the interplay of a range of different consequences.35 This Article aims to fill a gap in the existing scholarly literature by providing a fresh and more comprehensive comparative
account of several different types of collateral consequences, including
not only felon disenfranchisement but also loss of eligibility for welfare benefits, public housing, and certain types of employment. This
Article also offers reasons why the United States differs so dramatically from other countries with regard to these consequences.
A new comparative examination of collateral consequences is
needed now because reentry has become a pressing issue both in the
United States and abroad. Collateral consequences define to a large
extent the legal status of individuals with criminal records and can
make it quite difficult for these individuals to move past their
sentences and to reintegrate successfully into their communities.
Countries across the globe are devoting increased attention and
resources to the various needs of individuals exiting prisons and
returning to their communities.36 These countries are also considering
reentry strategies and implementing programs with the hopes of facilitating reintegration and reducing recidivism.37
In the United States, reentry has reached a critical point as communities absorb record numbers of individuals exiting correctional
institutions.38 The numerous collateral consequences that attach to
35

See, e.g., JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENAMERICAN DEMOCRACY 37–39, app. tbl.AI.I (2006) (comparing disenfranchisement policies of United States with several other countries, including England,
South Africa, and Canada); Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to
Society: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 753 (2000) (comparing disenfranchisement policies of U.S. and Germany).
36 See, e.g., JIM MCGINTY, REDUCING REOFFENDING—FOCUSING ON RE-ENTRY TO
THE COMMUNITY (2002) (suggesting reentry strategies to reduce recidivism in Australia,
based on visits to England, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and France); Editorial, A Positive
Form of Punishment, JAPAN TIMES (Tokyo), Aug. 3, 2006, at 12, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20060803a2.html (reporting Japanese Justice
Minister’s proposal for easing reentry and preventing recidivism); Joyce Mulama, A “Soft
Landing” To Keep Prisoners on the Straight and Narrow, INTER PRESS SERV., July 15, 2006,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33976 (on file with the New York University Law
Review) (noting statements by Kenyan NGO representative and prisons department
spokesperson expressing need for initiatives to address prisoner reentry in wake of
announcement that nearly 8000 inmates would be freed to reduce overcrowding in Kenyan
prisons).
37 See sources cited supra note 36.
38 See Eric Cadora et al., Criminal Justice and Health and Human Services: An Exploration of Overlapping Needs, Resources, and Interests in Brooklyn Neighborhoods, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN,
FRANCHISEMENT AND
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convictions frustrate reintegration for both individuals and whole
communities.39 Because so many individuals are now being released
each year from U.S. prisons,40 these consequences are affecting
greater numbers of individuals,41 and, by extension, greater numbers
of families42 and communities. Studies show that a relatively small
number of communities—specifically, neighborhoods in U.S. urban
centers—disproportionately absorb the reentering population.43 As a
result, these communities face particularly difficult challenges in reinFAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 285, 285 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003) [hereinafter PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED] (describing challenges created by “unprecedented numbers of people return[ing] home from prison”); Thompson, supra note 6, at 256 (discussing
“scale of the current [reentry] problem”).
39 See JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 85 (2004), available at http://meetings.
abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR209800/newsletterpubs/JusticeKennedy
CommissionReports_Final_081104.pdf (recommending that jurisdictions “eliminate
entirely those [collateral consequences] that . . . serve only to frustrate successful reentry”);
Gabriel J. Chin, Race, The War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 254 (2002) (describing how collateral consequences impact employment and ability “to lead law-abiding lives”); Nora V. Demleitner,
“Collateral Damage”: No Re-entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2002)
(noting that collateral consequences of drug convictions impede reintegration “by
restricting welfare benefits, employment and skills training opportunities”).
40 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
41 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 136 (2003) (noting that collateral
consequences are “being applied to a larger percentage of the U.S. population and for
longer periods of time than at any point in U.S. history”). For an argument that collateral
consequences are intertwined with the reentry process, see generally Michael Pinard, An
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006).
42 Donald Braman & Jennifer Wood, From One Generation to the Next: How Criminal
Sanctions Are Reshaping Family Life in Urban America, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED,
supra note 38, at 157, 171–74 (describing impact of employment-related obstacles on families); Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul, Prisoners Once Removed: The Children and Families
of Prisoners, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, supra note 38, at 1, 22–25 (describing how
collateral consequences impact families).
43 See, e.g., DIANA BRAZZELL & NANCY G. LA VIGNE, URBAN INST., PRISONER
REENTRY IN HOUSTON: COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES 1 (2009), available at http://www.
urban.org/UploadedPDF/411901_prisoner_reentry_houston.pdf (noting that over twenty
percent of inmates released from Texas prisons and jails return to Houston metropolitan
area); LISA E. BROOKS ET AL., URBAN INST., PRISONER REENTRY IN MASSACHUSETTS 1
(2005), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411167_Prisoner_Reentry_
MA.pdf (noting that over “one-third of [Massachusetts] prisoners released in 2002 came
from two Massachusetts counties—Suffolk and Worcester,” and that nearly half of those
returning to Suffolk County ended up “clustered in a few Boston neighborhoods”);
CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST., OHIO PRISONERS’ REFLECTIONS ON RETURNING
HOME 1 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311272_ohio_prisoners.
pdf (noting that over twenty percent of prisoners released in Ohio in 2004 returned to
Cuyahoga County, and nearly eighty percent of those returned to Cleveland); Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African-American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1276 (2004) (“[T]he exit and reentry of inmates is geographically concentrated in the poorest, minority neighborhoods.”).
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tegrating returning individuals.44 Thus, assessing the extent to which
the legal processes in the United States stigmatize individuals with
criminal records compared to the legal processes in the Comparison
Countries is of great import for reentering individuals, their families,
and their communities.
In addition, comparative analysis of collateral consequences is
fruitful because U.S. criminal justice policies appear to have influenced policies implemented in other countries,45 including policies
relating to individuals with criminal records.46 The international
impact of U.S. punishment schemes makes comparative analysis particularly useful. Other countries have adopted some U.S. policies
while rejecting others. For example, in the wake of the widespread
adoption of sex offender registration requirements in the United
States,47 the Comparison Countries all enacted similar but significantly less expansive laws.48 Comparative analysis can thus illustrate
alternative options for policymakers interested in reform.
44 See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 571, 596 (2003) (“Community stability may be impaired both by the loss of so
many adults [to incarceration] and, paradoxically, by their reentry into the community
after having endured the conditions of prison.” (footnote omitted)).
45 See CAVADINO & DIGNAN, supra note 14, at 50 (“[The United States] has . . . been
leading in the sense of moving in directions that others follow, not only in its penal practices but also in the ideology of how countries should respond to crime.”); Tim Newburn &
Richard Sparks, Criminal Justice and Political Cultures, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POLITICAL CULTURES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CRIME CONTROL 1,
9–10 (Tim Newburn & Richard Sparks eds., 2004) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
POLITICAL CULTURES] (noting influence United States. has had on other countries
regarding crime control policies).
46 See infra note 106.
47 In the United States, every state requires sex offenders to register with local law
enforcement or has some form of community notification law permitting members of the
general public to learn about sex offenders who live in the area. See Michael T. Cahill,
Attempt by Omission, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1237 (2009). Sex offender registration laws
gained prominence in 1994, when the New Jersey legislature enacted its “Megan’s Law,”
and the federal government “required states to register and gather information on sex
offenders under threat of losing a portion of federal funds if they did not comply.” Wayne
A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex
Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1172–73
(1999). By 1996, all of the states had enacted a registration requirement. See id. at 1173
n.26.
48 In 1997, England enacted a statute that required sex offenders to notify law enforcement authorities of their names and addresses, as well as to update the authorities of any
related changes. See Sex Offenders Act, 1997, c. 51 (Eng.), amended by Sexual Offenses
(Amendment) Act, 2000, c. 44 (Eng.). There has been spirited debate about whether to
enact community notification laws in addition to the reporting requirement. See Meghann
J. Dugan, Note, Megan’s Law or Sarah’s Law? A Comparative Analysis of Public Notification Statutes in the United States and England, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 617,
618 (2001) (discussing public debate). England began a project in September 2008 that
allows parents in four pilot areas in England to ask authorities whether individuals with
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B. Race, Dignity, and Collateral Consequences
Comparative analysis also illuminates the role that race and concepts of dignity play in collateral consequence policies. As will be
detailed below, a significant correlation exists between collateral consequences and race in the United States.49 Felon disenfranchisement,
the most long-standing of these consequences, originated during the
colonial era in the United States and continues, in various forms, in
the vast majority of states today. Post-Reconstruction disenfranchisement laws, tailored to exclude African Americans from voting, were
rooted in race.50
Other collateral consequences—such as restrictions on welfare
and housing benefits—dramatically increased in the 1980s and 1990s
in number and severity. Unlike the post-Reconstruction disenfranchisement laws, these consequences were not explicitly rooted in
racial animus. However, this significant expansion occurred during the
same time that the U.S. criminal justice system waged the “war on
drugs” that led to the exploding incarceration rates that continue to
disproportionately impact individuals and communities of color today.
Indeed, several of the consequences enacted during these decades
specifically targeted drug offenses, which are well-known to disproportionately impact African Americans and Latinos.51
access to their children are convicted sex offenders or have been suspected of sexually
abusing children. Matthew Hickley, Sarah’s Law Arrives 8 Years On, But Can It Really
Protect Children?, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Sept. 15, 2008, at 11.
In 2000, “frustrated by the lack of any federal government response” in Canada,
Alberta and Ontario enacted sex offender registration statutes. See Alfred J.C. O’Marra,
The Impact of Inquests on the Criminal Justice System in Ontario: A Decade of Change, 10
CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 144 (2006). Federal registration requirements were subsequently
enacted in 2004. Sex Offender Information Registration Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 10 (Can.),
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Statute/S/S-8.7.pdf. However, unlike the sex
offender registries in the United States, which are open to the public, the registry in
Canada is available only to law enforcement authorities in order to protect sex offenders’
privacy and facilitate their reentry into the community. Id. § 2; see also Paul Turenne, ‘Peg
Cop Slams Sex Offender Registry, WINNIPEG SUN (Can.), Aug. 2, 2006, at 3 (quoting police
commander stating that “[y]ou have to have reasonable grounds to believe the query will
assist in the investigation of a sexual offence”).
In 2007, South Africa adopted its sex offender registration law. See Criminal Law
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2007-032.pdf. However, the registry is limited to
offenders who commit their crimes “against a child or person who is mentally disabled.”
Id. s. 50. Moreover, like Canada, South Africa does not make its registry available to the
general public. Instead, it is available to employers, licensing agencies, and adoption or
foster care agencies. See id. ss. 43, 45, 47, 48.
49 See infra Part III.B.1.a.
50 See infra notes 319–22 and accompanying text.
51 See infra notes 335–48 and accompanying text.
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A comparative examination highlights the fact that race is significantly intertwined with current U.S. collateral consequence policies
and practices. Accordingly, this Article will examine collateral consequences in countries whose criminal justice systems have significant
similarities to the U.S. criminal justice system. In particular, it will
illustrate the ways in which the Comparison Countries have accounted
for the racially disparate impacts of their criminal justice practices.52
This Article’s comparative analysis will also focus on the relationship between collateral consequences and the concept of human dignity.53 Canada and South Africa, two countries that have embraced
broad international human rights notions of dignity, impose fewer and
less severe legal restrictions on individuals with criminal records than
does the United States.54 Similarly, England, Canada, and South
Africa also have legal provisions—in the form of pardons or national
expungement provisions—that more readily forgive individuals for
their past legal transgressions.55 The United States, in contrast, conceptualizes dignity very narrowly.56 As a result, the legal stigma that
attaches to a criminal record in the United States is more permanent
than in other countries with similar criminal justice systems.57
C. Obstacles to Comparative Analysis
While comparison is meaningful in the collateral consequences
context, it is not seamless. Scholars have long recognized the obstacles
to comparisons of legal practices across countries, particularly in the
criminal justice setting. As a practical matter, it can be exceedingly
difficult to obtain the materials necessary for meaningful comparisons.58 And even when the relevant sources are available, countries
have different customs, norms, laws, legal systems, and political systems that may make drawing meaningful comparisons extraordinarily
difficult, if not impossible.59 A nation’s laws and systems, in addition
52

See infra Part III.B.1.b.
See infra Part III.B.2.
54 See infra Part II.A.3–4.
55 See infra Part II.B.
56 See infra Part III.B.2.
57 See infra Part II.B.
58 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78
CAL. L. REV. 539, 551 (1990) (noting that comparative research presents methodological
problems due to “lack of reliable, comparable data on the actual functioning of different
systems”).
59 See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, in 36 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2007) [hereinafter CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS] (“In countries in which most or
some penal policies have become more severe, the reasons are not rising crime rates,
53
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to being rooted in localized traditions and customs, may also have
originated in response to unique local social conditions, such as high
crime rates or problems with particular types of criminal activity.
Scholars seeking to understand why the United States has the
highest incarceration rate in the world60 have confronted all of these
methodological challenges.61 They have offered several explainations
for the incarceration disparity between the United States and other
countries, including that the United States has particularly high crime
rates, which in turn lead to broader criminal laws;62 that the United
States has particular problems with violent crime;63 that incarceration
rates expanded as part of the “war on drugs”;64 that the United States
more frequently incarcerates individuals for nonviolent offenses;65
increased awareness of risk, globalization, or the conditions of late modernity, but rather
distinctive cultural, historical, constitutional and political conditions.”).
60 This fact has drawn much scholarly and media attention in the United States and
abroad. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 33 (2003) (noting high U.S. incarceration rate); Marsha Weissman, Aspiring
to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235 (2009) (same); J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive
Coma, 90 CAL. L. REV. 829 (2002) (same); Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs
Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1 (same); see also THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: GROWTH IN POPULATION CONTINUES 1 (2006),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_newfigures.pdf (discussing trends in incarceration growth in United States). For country incarceration rates,
see ROY WALMSLEY, HOME OFFICE (U.K.), WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (3d ed.
2002), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/r166.pdf.
61 Ian Dunbar and Anthony Langdon provide an informative discussion of the methodological difficulties inherent in efforts to establish the causes of high incarceration rates.
See IAN DUNBAR & ANTHONY LANGDON, TOUGH JUSTICE: SENTENCING AND PENAL
POLICIES IN THE 1990s, at 45 (1998) (“The prison population of any country is the product
both of crime and of a highly complex mix of attitudes and decisions in police forces,
prosecuting authorities, courts and legislatures.”).
62 See, e.g., James P. Lynch, A Comparison of Prison Use in England, Canada, West
Germany and the United States: A Limited Test of the Punitive Hypothesis, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 180, 181 (1988) (identifying higher crime rates and more encompassing
criminal laws as contributors to higher incarceration rate in United States).
63 See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 256 n.102 (2007) (“[T]he higher actual rate of violent
crime in the United States as compared to other industrialized countries may explain the
imprisonment trend: violent crime may help establish the political climate that fuels a
desire for incarceration.”); Sebastian Roche, Criminal Justice Policy in France: Illusions of
Severity, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS, note 59, at 471, 544 (“The contrast [in
punishment] between European nations and the United States cannot be understood
without taking violent and drug-related crime into account.”).
64 See, e.g., PETERSILIA, supra note 41, at 26 (noting number of women incarcerated for
drug offenses increased 888% during decade following passage of mandatory minimum
sentences for drug convictions in 1986); TONRY, supra note 21, at 81–82 (arguing that drugoffense sentences imposed as part of war on drugs were “single most important cause” of
dramatic rise in prison population from 1980 to mid-1990s).
65 See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 124–25 (1996) (noting that unlike
United States, which relies heavily on incarceration, other Western nations rely heavily on
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that judges and prosecutors in several jurisdictions across the United
States are elected, rather than appointed, and are thus subject to political pressure;66 and that issues of crime and punishment receive especially extensive media coverage in the United States.67 The great
variety of these explanations suggests that a comparative approach
cannot divorce the subject(s) of comparison from the political, social,
and cultural realities in which they developed and exist.
A comparative approach presents similar challenges in the collateral consequences context. To begin with, there are logistical difficulties in ascertaining the full range of consequences in other countries.68
In addition, culture, custom, and localized needs dramatically affect
the ways in which different societies view and treat individuals with
criminal records. Jurisdictions within a country often have particular
political or economic problems requiring locality-specific laws and
regulations.69 As noted below, this is particularly true in the United
States, where the scope of collateral consequences differs among the
states and even within each state.70
Another hurdle to comparative exploration of collateral consequences stems from the fact that in every society, individuals with
criminal records confront tension and even some degree of rejection
in the communities to which they return.71 For the purposes of this
Article, such tension and rejection are referred to as the “informal
consequences” of criminal convictions. They are “informal” in the
fines for “nontrivial” offenses); Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal
Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
397, 414 (2006) (“[T]he United States . . . clearly incarcerate[s] many more nonviolent
offenders than other nations . . . .”).
66 See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 59, at 23 (“Politicization of criminal justice policy is
directly related to whether prosecutors and judges are selected politically or
meritocratically.”).
67 ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES:
REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 29 (2008) (“The news media [in the United States] continues to have a significant impact on the development of public policy in the related areas
of prisons, crime, and delinquency.”); Tonry, supra note 59, at 18 (noting that “particular
forms of sensationalist journalism” are one determinant of country’s penal policy).
68 See Damaska, supra note 32, at 350 (“There are few countries of the world in which
we can find comprehensive surveys of consequences of conviction . . . .”).
69 See Rick Ruddell & L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., Setting Aside Criminal Convictions in
Canada: A Successful Approach to Offender Reintegration, 86 PRISON J. 452, 455 (2006)
(noting U.S. and Canadian “intranational” differences with regard to punishment
schemes).
70 See infra notes 183–88, 202–03, 206–07 and accompanying text.
71 HARJIT S. SANDHU, MODERN CORRECTIONS: THE OFFENDERS, THERAPIES AND
COMMUNITY REINTEGRATION 267 (1974) (noting that many individuals who have exited
correctional facilities “[c]arry[ ] with them the stigma of imprisonment, [and] are treated as
suspects and outcasts”).
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sense that they are not rooted in law.72 Informal consequences can
include the ways in which neighbors, family members, prospective
landlords, or employers treat the individual upon his or her return.
They can also include the ways in which community members treat the
family of the returning individual. For example, in South Africa individuals convicted of rape or child molestation, as well as their families,
are often stigmatized and sometimes even banished from their communities.73 In England and the United States, polls illustrate that
employers are reluctant to hire individuals with criminal records.74
Though these informal consequences are distinct from the legal consequences of criminal convictions, they may be just as harsh in practical
effect on an individual’s life.
While the informal limitations noted above are important,75 this
Article focuses on the formal consequences of criminal convictions.
Formal consequences are those that are mandated through laws
and/or regulations that place restrictions on individuals with criminal
records. Comparisons of formal collateral consequences across countries have value because they shed light on the ways in which the law
impacts reentry. Such comparisons can also identify alternative ways
of addressing reentry issues and concerns in the United States, with
the goal of enhancing opportunities for individuals to move past their
criminal record. Specifically, this Article focuses on those collateral
consequences that relate to housing, employment, public benefits, and
voting. The first three consequences are perhaps the most critical to
reentry because they directly impact an individual’s ability to sustain
him- or herself. Those related to voting have received the greatest
scholarly and media attention in the United States, as the ability to
vote acts as a measure of an individual’s civic standing in his or her
community.
72 Professor Mirjan Damaska describes these as the “social” consequences of a criminal
conviction, which he defines as “those that do not attach by virtue of a legal norm, but
rather on account of societal disapprobation (ostracism, refusal to employ, etc.).”
Damaska, supra note 32, at 347.
73 See Dirk van Zyl Smit, Civil Disabilities of Former Prisoners in a Constitutional
Democracy: Building on the South African Experience, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 255, 259–60 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005) (discussing
social consequences of conviction).
74 Harry J. Holzer et al., How Do Employer Perceptions of Crime and Incarceration
Affect the Employment Prospects of Less-Educated Young Black Men?, in BLACK MALES
LEFT BEHIND 67, 73 (Ronald B. Mincy ed., 2006); Ex-offenders ‘Face Jobs Struggle,’ BBC
NEWS, Aug. 31, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4197808.stm.
75 Social stigma is significant both in its own right and because it often interacts with
collateral consequences to exacerbate reentry hurdles. HARRY E. ALLEN & CLIFFORD E.
SIMONSEN, CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 427 (8th ed. 1998).
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D. Selection of Countries for Comparative Examination
This Article comparatively examines the ways in which the
United States, England, Canada, and South Africa impose legal obstacles upon formerly incarcerated individuals.76 The United States,
England, and Canada all possess democratic political institutions and
share a similar legal culture rooted in English common law.77 These
countries’ criminal justice systems have many similarities, including
relatively high incarceration rates and the disproportionate incarceration of racial minorities.78 Because of these similarities, commentators
have compared various aspects of the U.S. criminal justice system,
particularly its criminalization and punishment policies and methods,
with the English and Canadian systems.79 While many of these com76 Certainly, other countries have similar characteristics for comparative purposes. For
instance, Scotland, Ireland, and Australia share similar histories with England, and their
criminal justice systems are largely rooted in English common law. KENNETH
ROBERTS-WRAY, COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL LAW 32–35, 665–69, 874–80 (1966).
Moreover, like Canada, Australia has an Aboriginal population that has suffered historical
discrimination and is overrepresented in its prisons. Compare JOHN WALKER & DAVID
MCDONALD, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PUB. NO. 47, THE OVER-REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN
CUSTODY IN AUSTRALIA (1995), available at http://aic.gov.au/documents/D/2/6/
%7BD260592C-A92B-4A5C-BAE0-ADBBBCBD3BFD%7Dti47.pdf (discussing overrepresentation of Australia’s Aboriginal population in prison), with ROGER E. BOE, CORR.
SERV. OF CAN., FORUM ON CORR. RESEARCH, ABORIGINAL INMATES: DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS 7–9 (2000) (discussing overrepresentation of Canada’s
Aboriginal population in prison). While a broader comparative examination could include
these countries and others, it simply would be too long for a law review article. As such,
this Article focuses on England and Canada—whose criminal justice systems are often
compared to that of the United States—as well as South Africa, which has a similar history
of racial subjugation and scholarly literature that has exposed collateral consequences and
reentry issues.
77 See James Lynch, Crime in International Perspective, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
CRIME CONTROL 5, 7 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002) (noting that criminal
justice systems in countries such as England and Canada would provide particularly “useful
points of comparison” with United States “because they have similar levels of participation
in the major institutions of social control . . . ; they are democracies; and they have
common law legal traditions”). More broadly, Michael Tonry explains that the criminal
justice systems of Western countries are very similar in their “reliance on imprisonment as
the primary sanction for very serious crimes” and in the “content of [their] criminal law
doctrine[s], rules of evidence, and procedural safeguards.” Michael Tonry, Punishment Policies and Patterns in Western Countries, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN
COUNTRIES 3, 3 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001).
78 See infra Part I.D.1–2 (describing increases in incarceration rates, particularly with
regard to racial minorities, in England and Canada in 1990s, and explaining influence of
U.S. criminal justice policies on England and Canada).
79 See Deflem & Swygart, supra note 20, at 52 (providing examples of comparative
criminal justice research involving United States, Canada, and England); Candace
Kruttschnitt & Rosemary Gartner, Women’s Imprisonment, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry, ed., 2003) (comparing rates of female incarceration in United States, Canada, and England); Lynch, supra note 77, at 7 (finding compari-
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mentators have concluded that England and Canada have significantly
less severe criminal sanctions than the United States,80 these countries
have actually become increasingly punitive in recent years81 and have
implemented more stringent punishment schemes.82
This Article also includes South Africa in its comparative examination. South Africa recently shifted from a White-controlled authoritarian government, in which Blacks comprised the majority but were
treated as the underclass, to a Black-controlled democratic government.83 Crime and public safety were significant issues in the immediate post-apartheid era and remain so today,84 resulting in South
Africa having one of the highest incarceration rates in the world.85 In
addition, prisoner reentry is a prominent issue in South Africa, which
is dealing with an exploding prisoner population and with prisoners
who are increasingly serving long sentences.86
Moreover, South Africa’s recently adopted Constitution87 has
drawn the attention of several United States’ commentators, who
have detailed and analyzed the Constitution’s governing principles.88
South Africa’s Constitution, post-apartheid and more recent criminal
sons between United States and countries such as Canada and England to be useful
because they exhibit “similar levels of participation in the major institutions of social control . . . ; they are democracies; and they have common law legal traditions”).
80 Lynch, supra note 77, at 5 (“The United States uses imprisonment for every crime
more often than other industrialized nations.”).
81 See GABBIDON, supra note 29, at 52 (“[T]he increasing use of prisons in Britain
during the 1990s clearly paralleled the ‘get tough’ approach in the United States that led to
an inflated American prison population.”).
82 See infra notes 102–07, 135–36 and accompanying text.
83 See GABBIDON, supra note 29, at 204 (discussing transition from Apartheid to democratic regime).
84 Id. at 218–22.
85 See ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON,
WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1, 2 (8th ed. 2009), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/
depsta/law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf (noting that while nearly three-fifths
of countries incarcerate fewer than 150 individuals per 100,000 of their populations, South
Africa incarcerates 335 per 100,000).
86 See Michelle Jones, Prisons Are Overcrowded ‘to the Point of Collapse,’ PRETORIA
NEWS (S. Afr.), Oct. 13, 2009, at 5 (noting that South Africa’s prisons are overcrowded and
percentage of prisoners serving at least seven years had increased from thirty-five percent
in 1998 to sixty-eight percent in 2009); see also LUKAS MUNTINGH, AFTER PRISON: THE
CASE FOR OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 55–72 (2001) (discussing reentry services provided
by nongovernmental organizations in South Africa).
87 S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
88 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004)
(comparing U.S. Constitution with South Africa’s and others); Jack Greenberg, A Tale of
Two Countries, United States and South Africa, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1291 (1997) (comparing constitutional jurisprudence regarding death penalty in South Africa and United
States); Peter E. Quint, What Is a Twentieth-Century Constitution?, 67 MD. L. REV. 238
(2007) (comparing U.S. Constitution with constitutions of South Africa and Germany).
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justice policies, increasing prison population, and close attention to
reentry issues create robust avenues for comparison to U.S. policies.
While the Comparison Countries differ politically and socially
from the United States in important ways, all three have high incarceration rates relative to other countries.89 Moreover, Canada and
England have adopted “law and order” reforms that are similar to
practices in the United States.90 Also, as will be explained below, individuals exiting penal institutions in England and particularly South
Africa confront significant legal obstacles that can impede
reintegration.
In addition, comparison with England, Canada, and South Africa
is meaningful because they are not among the countries that provide
the broadest support to individuals with criminal records; thus, they
are still relatively similar to the United States. For example, other
Western European countries, such as Germany and Finland, provide
much more social welfare support to prisoners than the Comparison
Countries, and they have reintegration policies that more affirmatively assist newly released individuals in rejoining their
communities.91
Unlike individuals with criminal records in the Comparison
Countries, those in the United States face a broad range of postincarceration legal penalties that can span their lifetimes and therefore make it extraordinarily difficult, and oftentimes impossible, to
move past their criminal records and lead productive post-incarceration lives. To illustrate this point, the following sections will compare
some of the post-sentence legal penalties imposed on individuals in
the United States with those imposed on individuals in England,
Canada, and South Africa.
89 For England, see infra note 111 and accompanying text; for Canada, see infra note
141 and accompanying text; for South Africa, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 102–07, 135–36 and accompanying text.
91 For instance, inmates in Germany are expected to hold prison jobs that resemble
“real jobs” outside of prison, and they “enjoy far-reaching protection against arbitrary discharge, and . . . four weeks per year of paid vacation.” JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND
EUROPE 8 (2003). In addition, inmates who worked while in German prisons and who
cannot find work upon release are eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Herta Tóth,
Comparative Report Based on National Reports’ Fieldwork Findings, in WOMEN, INTEGRATION AND PRISON 22, 56 (Marta Cruells & Noelia Igareda eds., 2005), available at
http://cps.ceu.hu/jointpubl_womenintegrationprison.php. Moreover, the government will
pay these inmates’ outside housing rents for one year of incarceration to help preserve
their housing. Id. In Finland, inmates with short sentences are permitted to work for wages,
while inmates with longer sentences are expected to work or pursue vocational training.
Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the Repressive
Ideal, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, supra note 77, at 92, 100.
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1. England
The United States shares a uniquely close history with England.92
British colonists brought practices rooted in English law and tradition
to the United States. Many features of the U.S. criminal justice
system, including collateral consequences, originated in England.93
U.S. collateral consequences are vestiges of the “civil death” that historically accompanied conviction in England,94 where individuals convicted of serious offenses lost all political, civil, and legal rights,
including the right to contract, marry, and sue.95
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the United States and
England began reforming their penal systems based on the philosophy
of “penal welfare,” the main goal of which was to rehabilitate
offenders.96 Sentences were individualized, with the punishment tailored to meet offenders’ particularized needs. Both the United States
and England began to depart from the penal welfare model in the
1970s.97 However, the United States took a sharper turn during this
period, as it scaled back rehabilitative programs and shifted, to a considerable extent, to more punitive forms of punishment.98 For
example, during this period the United States moved from indeterminate sentencing schemes—which had given judges broad discretion in
sentencing most cases—to determinate sentencing schemes, under
92 See HIRSCHEL & WAKEFIELD, supra note 20, at 20 (noting “many commonalities
between England and the United States” including “a common language and a common
cultural heritage”).
93 See HUGH C. BANKS ET AL., CIVIL DISABILITIES OF EX-OFFENDERS 3 (1974) (“Contemporary civil disabilities laws have their origins in English common law concepts such as
infamy and civil death.”).
94 See Neil P. Cohen & Dean Hill Rivkin, Civil Disabilities: The Forgotten Punishment,
35 FED. PROBATION 19 (1971) (noting that American jurisprudence followed English tradition of civil death by adopting numerous civil disability laws).
95 See Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1049 n.13, 1060 (discussing
civil death).
96 See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 34–35 (2001) (tracing origins of penal welfarism to 1890s, stating
that it was “established policy framework” in United States and Britain by 1970, and
explaining that penal welfare principles included “indeterminate sentences linked to early
release and parole supervision; . . . social work with offenders and their families; and custodial regimes that stressed the re-educative purposes of imprisonment and the importance
of re-integrative support upon release”).
97 See PHILIP PRIESTLEY ET AL., SOCIAL SKILLS IN PRISON AND THE COMMUNITY:
PROBLEM SOLVING FOR OFFENDERS 1 (1984) (noting that from end of World War II “until
the mid-1970s, English penal policy was broadly characterised by an emphasis on keeping
people out of custodial institutions”).
98 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6
(2003) (noting that rehabilitation was “the central professed goal of American criminal
justice—at least in most public rhetoric—until the final quarter of the twentieth century”).
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which judges were bound by sentencing guidelines.99 As a result of
this shift, incarceration rates in the United States began to rise dramatically in the mid-1970s.100
Although England likewise began scaling back its penal welfare
approach in the 1970s, its incarceration rates did not rise dramatically
until the 1990s, when issues involving crime and punishment began to
attract greater media and political attention in England.101 In
response, England scaled back its rehabilitative programs and adopted
several “law and order” criminal justice policies similar to those
implemented in the United States. Specifically, it criminalized certain
types of “anti-social behaviour”102 and implemented punishment
schemes similar to some of those imposed in the United States,103 such
as mandatory minimums for specific offenses,104 increased penalties
for drug offenses,105 and two- and three-strikes laws.106
99 See Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in
SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, supra note 77, at 222, 223–24
(noting that many U.S. jurisdictions have adopted determinate sentencing schemes since
1970s, all of which “seek to cabin, or even eliminate, the former reservoirs of case-by-case
sentencing discretion held by trial judges and parole officials”). However, several states
have maintained indeterminate sentencing schemes. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Perspectives on Sentencing Policy and Research, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN
COUNTRIES, supra note 77, at 259, 262.
100 See Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming
Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1184–85 (2006) (noting several
commonly offered explanations for increased incarceration rates over last quarter century,
including mandatory minimum sentencing laws and “the increased adoption of sentencing
guidelines”); see also Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality,
and the Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 858 (2009) (“From 1974, the
prison population began to grow, and the incarceration rate increased continuously for the
next three decades.”).
101 See Andrew Ashworth, The Decline of English Sentencing and Other Stories, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, supra note 77, at 62, 85 (describing
influence of mass media in England on “recent sentencing policy and practice”); Tim
Newburn, “Tough on Crime”: Penal Policy in England and Wales, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT,
AND POLITICS, supra note 59, at 425, 426 (“[I]n the early 1990s, . . . the two main political
parties locked themselves into a second-order consensus around the need to be seen to be
‘tough on crime.’”).
102 Adam Crawford, Criminalizing Sociability Through Anti-social Behaviour Legislation: Dispersal Powers, Young People and the Police, 9 YOUTH JUST. 5, 5 (2009) (“[T]he
capacious definition of anti-social behaviour extends to a wide range of activities, misdemeanours, incivilities and (sometimes quite serious) crimes. In legislation it is defined as
behaviour that ‘causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ to others.” (footnote omitted)).
103 England is not alone among European countries in this regard. See, e.g., WHITMAN,
supra note 91, at 69–70 (explaining that France and Germany have implemented harsher
punishment schemes in past thirty years).
104 See CAVADINO & DIGNAN, supra note 14, at 70 (noting that mandatory minimum
sentence for illegal possession of firearm was implemented in 2003).
105 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 284, sched. 28 (Eng.) (increasing maximum penalties for certain drug-related offenses from five to fourteen years of imprisonment).
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Crime control strategies in the United States and England have
also grown increasingly similar in recent years.107 Perhaps most significantly, the incarceration rates in England have increased dramatically
in the past two decades.108 England’s prison population grew nearly
seventy percent between 1993 and 2005,109 and its custodial sentences
increased forty percent between 1997 and 2007.110 As of 2005,
England had the highest incarceration rate in Western Europe.111
In addition, vast racial disparities exist within the incarcerated
populations of both the United States and England. In the United
States, African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately incarcerated at both the state and federal levels relative to their representation in the overall population.112 Similarly, in England, which began to
106 See Crime (Sentences) Act, 1997, c. 43, § 2 (Eng.) (providing for mandatory life sentence for second commission of “serious offence”). See generally Trevor Jones & Tim
Newburn, Three Strikes and You’re Out: Exploring Symbol and Substance in American and
British Crime Control Politics, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 781 (2006) (comparing two- and
three-strikes laws enacted in United Kingdom in late 1990s with U.S. three-strikes laws and
explaining that U.K. laws are more moderate than U.S. versions).
107 See GARLAND, supra note 96, at 168 (noting similarity of crime control strategies in
United States and United Kingdom since 1980s, including increases in length of prison
sentences, average time served, use of custodial sentences, and “likelihood of being
returned to custody from parole”); Trevor Jones & Tim Newburn, The Convergence of U.S.
& U.K. Crime Control Policy: Exploring Substance and Process, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND
POLITICAL CULTURES, supra note 45, at 123, 126 (noting that United States has influenced
crime control policies in United Kingdom).
108 See Shadd Maruna et al., Ex-offender Reintegration: Theory and Practice, in AFTER
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION, supra note 7, at 6
(noting that prison population in United Kingdom has risen dramatically since 1992).
109 Newburn, supra note 101, at 434. Incarceration rates in the United States and
England are affected greatly by the vast number of individuals who are returned to prisons
for violating technical conditions of their release, as opposed to committing new crimes. In
the United States, “[h]igh parole revocation rates [are] one of the major factors linked to
the growing . . . prison population.” PETERSILIA, supra note 41, at 148. Similarly, individuals in England have been increasingly “recalled” to custody. Just over half of these individuals are recalled for violating conditions of release, such as missing curfew or missing
appointments with probation officers. Nicola Padfield & Shadd Maruna, The Revolving
Door at the Prison Gate: Exploring the Dramatic Increase in Recalls to Prison, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 329, 330–32 (2006).
110 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (U.K.), 2007 SENTENCING STATISTICS: ENGLAND AND WALES
31 (2008), available at www.justice.gov.uk/about/docs/sentencing-statistics-2007.pdf. These
statistics include those who were sentenced to “immediate” custody and those who
received suspended custodial sentences. Although immediate custodial sentences in 2007
were the second lowest recorded in a decade, the increased custody rate between 1997 and
2007 is attributed to the more frequent use of immediate custody in the first part of this
decade followed by the more recent increased use of suspended custodial sentences. Id.
111 Newburn, supra note 101, at 435; see also Philip Johnston, Jails Almost at Bursting
Point, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 30, 2006, at 2 (noting that jails in England
are overcrowded and that incarcerated population is expected to continue increasing in
near future).
112 See SABOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 tbl.2 (finding that, as of year-end 2008, there
were approximately 3161 African American male prisoners per 100,000 African American
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monitor prisoner ethnicity in 1984,113 persons of African and African
Caribbean descent are disproportionately incarcerated.114 Moreover,
“[p]rison receptions of all known Black and Minority Ethnic groups
increased by 37 per cent between 1998 and 2002—more than 8 times
the increase for white prisoners.”115 The overrepresentation of people
of color in England’s criminal justice system, particularly the
“alarming increase in the number of mostly second-generation males
and females of African Caribbean origin in the prison population,”116
has received significant scholarly and media attention.117
Moreover, the United States and England have both recently
seen significant shifts in the numbers of women prisoners. In the
United States, the number of women prisoners has increased dramatically from 64,403 women prisoners in 1994118 to 106,410 women prisoners at midyear 2008.119 In England, the number of women prisoners
likewise surged between 1990 and 2000.120 In addition, women of
men, 1200 Hispanic male prisoners per 100,000 Hispanic men, and 487 White male prisoners per 100,000 White men).
113 STEPHEN SHUTE ET AL., A FAIR HEARING? ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTS 2–3 (2005).
114 As of June 2007, Black English nationals were incarcerated at rates five times greater
than Whites, and individuals from mixed-ethnic backgrounds were incarcerated at rates
nearly three times greater than Whites. ALEX JONES & LAWRENCE SINGER, MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE (U.K.), STATISTICS ON RACE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM—2006/7, at 91
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/stats-race-criminal-justice.pdf.
115 SMARTJUSTICE, THE RACIAL JUSTICE GAP: RACE AND THE PRISON POPULATION
BRIEFING 2 (2004), available at http://www.bulger.co.uk/prison/SmartJusticeRaceBriefing.
pdf. Specifically, “[t]he numbers of Black people, Chinese and other, South Asians and
White people rose by 34 per cent, 61 per cent, 24 per cent and 4 per cent respectively”
between 1998 and 2002. Id.; see also Anthony Goodman & Vincenzo Ruggiero, Crime,
Punishment, and Ethnic Minorities in England and Wales, 2 RACE/ETHNICITY 53, 56 (2008)
(“[Black and Minority Ethnic] groups are overrepresented at each stage of the criminal
justice system . . . .”).
116 SHUTE ET AL., supra note 113, at 2–3.
117 Id. at 2, 3 & nn.3 & 5 (citing academic articles about and press coverage of these
disparities).
118 ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL K. GILLIARD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ-151654, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1994, at 5 (1995), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf.
119 HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ-225619, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008—
STATISTICAL TABLES, 10 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim08
st.pdf.
120 See Kruttschnitt & Gartner, supra note 79, at 11 (reporting that number of women
prisoners in England increased more than 100% between 1990 and 2000). The number of
women sentenced to prison has decreased since 2002. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (U.K.),
STATISTICS ON WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 38 (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/women-criminal-justice-system-07-08.pdf. However, the
overall number of women prisoners—which includes those awaiting trial, those who have
been convicted but not yet sentenced, and those who have been sentenced—has fluctuated
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color in both the United States and England are incarcerated at rates
disproportionate to their numbers in the general population.121 As in
the United States, the reentry issues for women in England are particularly complex, largely due to the fact that many are mothers of
dependent children, have unmet housing needs,122 have difficulty
establishing child benefit claims,123 and receive inadequate rehabilitation services.124
Last, like the United States, England has recognized reentry—
termed there as “resettlement”—as a critical moment in the lives of
the formerly incarcerated.125 As increasing numbers of individuals exit
English penal institutions and resettle into communities, attention to
resettlement has heightened.126 While both England and the United
States recognize that reentry/resettlement affects not only formerly
incarcerated individuals, but also their families and communities,
England has richer and more sustained traditions of providing reentry
services than the United States.127 In addition, an extensive study in
England has detailed the many financial difficulties individuals exiting
in the past decade, increasing from an average female prison population of 4299 in 2002 to
4467 in 2005, and decreasing to 4374 in 2007. Id. at 45–46.
121 As of 2008, an African American woman was three times more likely to be serving a
federal or state prison sentence than a White woman. SABOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 tbl.2
(finding that 149 African American women per 100,000 African American women and 50
White women per 100,000 White women were incarcerated). This is a decrease from 2000,
when African American women “were incarcerated at a rate 6 times that of White
women.” WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007, at 8 (2008), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf; see also Kruttschnitt & Gartner, supra
note 79, at 19 (“In England and Wales, . . . a black woman is about ten times more likely to
be serving time in prison than is a white woman.”).
122 See IAN PAYLOR, HOUSING NEEDS OF EX-OFFENDERS 33–34 (1995) (“The proposition that women prisoners [in England] suffer disproportionately in terms of the housing
market upon release has indeed been borne out by the limited research that has been
conducted into the experiences of women who have fallen foul of the criminal justice
system.”).
123 Pat Carlen & Anne Worrall, National Report England and Wales, in WOMEN, INTEGRATION AND PRISON, supra note 91, at 117, 122.
124 See SUNITA TOOR, SAVING OTHERS THROUGH VOLUNTEER ACTION, MANUAL ON
TACKLING BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN LEAVING PRISON 9 (2005), available
at http://www.equal-works.com/resources/contentfiles/405.doc (noting “need for the development of a holistic approach . . . [for] helping women back into the job market”).
125 See Mike Maguire & Peter Raynor, How the Resettlement of Prisoners Promotes
Desistance from Crime: Or Does It?, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 19, 20–21 (2006).
126 See, e.g., id. at 21–22 (“The case for more government attention to [reentry] was built
up through a combination of academic research findings, campaigning by agencies . . . and
a joint [government agency] report on the problems of prisoners leaving custody. . . .”
(citations omitted)).
127 See id. at 21 (noting that charitable organizations have assisted formerly incarcerated
individuals leaving prison in England throughout nineteenth and twentieth centuries);
Maruna et al., supra note 108, at 6 (opining that reentry issues are arguably “less dire” in
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correctional facilities face.128 Despite these long-standing efforts, however, England confronts recidivism rates similar to that of the United
States, with approximately two-thirds of individuals released from its
prisons reconvicted of an offense within two years of release.129
2. Canada
The United States and Canada have “very similar origins in
British Common Law and shar[e] many cultural similarities.”130 Both
countries have federalist political structures131 and have experienced
similar patterns of fluctuations in crime rates.132 Like the United
States, the number of incarcerated individuals in Canada has
increased since the mid-1970s, largely as a result of “get tough” policies and public pressure to increase sentences.133 In the past two
decades, the number of crimes in Canada that carry mandatory minimum sentences has quadrupled.134 In this same period, Canada has
also significantly increased sentences for certain offenses135 and has
Britain than in United States because Britain has longer history “of addressing the housing,
employment and counselling needs of released prisoners”).
128 See generally ANN HAGELL ET AL., FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES ON RELEASE FROM
PRISON (1995) (discussing, inter alia, need for accommodation and employment).
129 PRISON REFORM TRUST, BROMLEY BRIEFINGS: PRISON FACTFILE 5 (2006), available
at http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/uploads/documents/factfile1807lo.pdf.
130 Ruddell & Winfree, supra note 69, at 455.
131 See Jean-Paul Brodeur, Comparative Penology in Perspective, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS, supra note 59, at 49, 68 (noting that both Canadians and Americans
elect representatives at local (provincial) and national levels).
132 Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, Punitive Trends and Stable Imprisonment Rates in Canada, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS, supra note 59, at 302–03
(noting that Canada has “crime culture” similar to both United States and England, and
that reported crimes increased substantially in Canada and United States beginning in
1960s and then “level[ed] off” in both countries in early 1990s).
133 COLIN H. GOFF, CORRECTIONS IN CANADA 18 (1999).
134 See Morris J. Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 70 (2008) (noting that number of crimes that carry
mandatory minimum sentences have increased from nine in late 1980s to approximately
forty in 2007). The number of offenses that carry mandatory minimum sentences may
expand still further in the near future, as the Canadian Parliament is considering a bill to
impose mandatory sentences for particular drug offenses. TANYA DUPUIS & ROBIN
MACKAY, PARLIAMENTARY INFO. & RESEARCH SERV., LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY, BILL
C-15: AN ACT TO AMEND THE CONTROLLED DRUGS AND SUBSTANCES ACT AND TO
MAKE RELATED AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS TO OTHER ACTS 1 (2009),
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/40/2/c15-e.pdf.
135 See Webster & Doob, supra note 132, at 316 (“Canada witnessed the introduction in
1996 of mandatory minimum sentences (of four years in prison) that were enacted for
offenders committing any of ten serious violent crimes with a firearm. Similarly, the maximum sanctions for certain offenses were increased during the 1990s.”).
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expanded the bases for charging youth as adults.136 As a result,
Canada’s incarceration rates rose dramatically in the early 1990s.137
However, Canadian prison rates declined from 1997 to 2005138 due to
conscious government efforts to reduce the imprisonment rate in
order to contain escalating costs.139 Yet the number of individuals currently incarcerated has been on the rise again since 2005,140 and
Canada still has one of the highest incarceration rates among Western
nations.141
Canada is also similar to England and the United States in that it
disproportionately incarcerates members of ethnic minority groups,
notably Aborigines.142 In 2007–2008, Aborigines constituted approximately four percent of the Canadian adult population.143 However,
they constituted seventeen percent of the total federal offender population.144 As of April 2008, Aboriginal women and men constituted
136 Id. (noting that process for youth transfers was altered “by creating ‘presumptive
transfers’ to adult court of those over sixteen years old charged with a serious violent
offense”).
137 Vivien Stern, The International Impact of U.S. Policies, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:
THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 279, 282 (Marc Mauer &
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
138 STATISTICS CAN., THE DAILY, ADULT AND YOUTH CORRECTIONAL SERVICES: KEY
INDICATORS 2 (2008), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/081209/dq081209-eng.pdf.
139 See GOFF, supra note 133, at 23–25 (noting that concerns regarding costs of incarceration led Canadian federal government to embrace less costly crime control strategies such
as community prevention programs); Julian V. Roberts & Thomas Gabor, Lessons from
the Canadian Experience in Decarceration, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 92, 94 (2004) (noting
that Canada introduced conditional sentences in 1996 “with the express goal of reducing
the use of incarceration as a sanction, for [it] has traditionally had a high rate of incarceration relative to other Western nations”); Stern, supra note 137, at 282 (noting that incarceration rate fell in wake of 1996 reforms to conditional sentencing).
140 STATISTICS CAN., supra note 138, at 2 (“Canada’s incarceration rate in 2007/2008
rose by 2% from the previous year, the third consecutive annual increase.”).
141 Id.
142 Canada generally measures its incarcerated population by ethnicity (Aboriginal/nonAboriginal) rather than race (for example, Black/White). See, e.g., STATISTICS CAN.,
CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, ADULT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES IN CANADA:
2003–2004, at 10 (2005) (tracking ethnicity but not race); Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N.
Doob, Race, Ethnicity and Criminal Justice in Canada, in 21 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
ETHNICITY, CRIME AND IMMIGRATION 469, 478 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997) (noting that
while Ontario tracks data for other racial groups, such as Blacks and Asians, Quebec and
British Columbia do not). Canada implemented sentencing reforms in 1996 aimed at
addressing the overrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders in its provincial prisons. However, at least one study has concluded that these reforms “failed to generate a lower
volume of sentenced admissions for Aboriginal offenders[.]” Julian V. Roberts & Ronald
Melchers, The Incarceration of Aboriginal Offenders: Trends from 1978 to 2001, 45 CAN. J.
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 211, 236 (2003).
143 PUB. SAFETY CAN. PORTFOLIO CORRECTIONS STATISTICS COMM., CORRECTIONS &
CONDITIONAL RELEASE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 57 (2008), available at http://www.public
safety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/2008-04-ccrso-eng.pdf.
144 Id.
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thirty-three percent and nineteen percent, respectively, of those incarcerated in federal or provincial institutions.145
Despite these similarities, there are vast differences between the
U.S. and Canadian criminal justice and correctional systems. These
differences in large measure reflect Canada’s more liberal, “penal welfare” approach to issues such as sentencing and incarceration,146
which have made the Canadian punishment system a model for several other Western countries.147 Because it resisted many of the policies associated with the “war on drugs” in the United States,148
Canada did not experience the dramatic incarceration increases that
occurred in the United States. While Canada’s incarceration rates
increased significantly in the early 1990s,149 its overall rates have
remained relatively constant from 1960 to 2005.150
In-prison rehabilitative programs are also more readily available
in Canada than in the United States.151 Canada’s more accessible
rehabilitative programs are attributable, in part, to the fact that all
individuals in Canada sentenced to two or more years of incarceration
145

Id.
See Debra Parkes, Prisoner Voting Rights in Canada: Rejecting the Notion of Temporary Outcasts, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 73, at 237, 240
(noting that while Canadian penal law and policy has become more punitive in recent
years, “a considerable amount of the law and policy governing sentencing and imprisonment remains consistent with liberal, penal welfare concepts”).
147 See Dawn Moore & Kelly Hannah-Moffat, The Liberal Veil: Revisiting Canadian
Penality, in THE NEW PUNITIVENESS: TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES 85, 85 (John Pratt
et al. eds., 2005) (“[T]he practices and rationales of punishment in Canada are exported
through the Western world.”).
148 For instance, in 1987, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that a mandatory
seven-year sentence for importing narcotics violated the cruel and unusual punishment
protections of the Canadian Charter. R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (Can.). Canada’s
existing narcotics statute establishes a number of mandatory maximum sentences.
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 1996 S.C., ch. 19, §§ 4–7 (Can.). However, legislative efforts to impose mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses continue. In 2007, a
bill was introduced seeking to impose a range of mandatory minimum sentences for drug
offenses. Controlled Drugs and Substances Amendment Act, C-26, 39th Parliament (2007)
(Can.). The bill was reintroduced in February 2009, and passed in the House of Commons
in June 2009. Controlled Drugs and Substances Amendment Act, C-15, 40th Parliament
(2009) (Can.). After passing the Senate with amendments, as of December 2009, this bill
was awaiting action in the House. Parliament of Canada, LEGISInfo, Status of Bill C-15
(Dec. 30, 2009), http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Sites/LOP/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language=E&
query=5739&List=toc&Session=22 (follow “Status of the Bill”).
149 See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text (discussing reason for increase).
150 Canada’s imprisonment rate from 1960–2003 hovered around 100 per 100,000
residents. Webster & Doob, supra note 132, at 311 fig.7. The lowest incarceration rate was
83 per 100,000 residents in 1974, and the highest rate was 116 per 100,000 residents in 1995.
Id. Canada’s stable imprisonment rates stand in stark contrast to trends in England and the
United States, where incarceration rates have increased sharply in recent decades. Id. at
298–99.
151 Ruddell & Winfree, supra note 69, at 455–56.
146
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serve their time in federal (as opposed to provincial) prisons,152 and to
the fact that the Canadian federal correctional system treats rehabilitation and reintegration as interconnected goals.153 As a result, “there
is more similarity in the types and availability of treatment and rehabilitative opportunities that Canadian prisoners serving more than
[two] years will receive than their American counterparts in state
prisons.”154
3. South Africa
South Africa is particularly fascinating for comparative purposes
in the collateral consequences context. It has a long and pernicious
history of imposing collateral consequences on individuals with criminal convictions. During the apartheid era, the White-controlled government used criminal law “as a vehicle of control.”155 Not only were
individuals prosecuted because of their opposition to the government’s policies but they were also subjected to numerous civil disabilities upon release.156 Among other constraints, these individuals were
often detained after having served their sentences, subjected to house
arrest, and denied the right to stand for parliament.157
The dismantling of apartheid in the 1990s ushered in a Blackcontrolled democratic government, as well as a wave of new rights,
privileges, and reforms that traversed all aspects of South Africa’s
society, including the criminal justice system.158 At the same time,
152 See Allan Manson, The Structure of the Canadian Sentencing System, 9 FED. SENT’G
REP. 235, 235 (1997) (“For a reason which history has entrusted only to the long-since
departed participants in the constitutional conferences which occurred between 1864 and
1867, the Constitution Act, 1867 gave the federal Parliament authority over penitentiaries
while provincial governments are responsible for local prisons, jails, remand centers and
other correctional facilities. The distinction between the two kinds of correctional institutions is clear: penitentiaries house those sentenced to terms of imprisonment of two years
or more while prisoners awaiting trial and those sentenced to terms of less than two years
are confined in provincial and territorial institutions.”). Individuals sentenced to less than
two years are housed in provincial jails. Roberts & Doob, supra note 142, at 478.
153 Corrections and Conditional Release Act, 1992 S.C., ch. 20, § 3(b) (Can.) (“The purpose of the federal correctional system is to contribute to the maintenance of a just,
peaceful and safe society by . . . assisting the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law-abiding citizens through the provision of programs in penitentiaries and in the community.”).
154 Ruddell & Winfree, supra note 69, at 456.
155 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Mandela to Mthwana: Providing Counsel to the Unrepresented Accused in South Africa, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995).
156 van Zyl Smit, supra note 73, at 255.
157 van Zyl Smit, supra note 73, at 255–56.
158 See generally Kristin Henrard, Post Apartheid South Africa’s Democratic Transformation Process: Redress of the Past, Reconciliation and ‘Unity in Diversity,’ GLOBAL REV.
ETHNOPOLITICS, Mar. 2002, at 18 (discussing South Africa’s transition from Apartheid to
democratic regime).
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there was widespread fear of crime throughout South Africa during
this historic transition period.159 As a result, during this period the
criminal justice system focused on incapacitation and retribution,
rather than rehabilitation.160 Thus, despite its dramatic political transformation, South Africa “remains a country with high levels of punishment and a punitive public mentality.”161 Beginning in 1997, South
Africa toughened its punishment scheme in various ways, such as
imposing minimum sentences for particularly serious crimes.162 Consequently, South Africa’s prisoners have been serving dramatically
longer sentences since 1998, and its prisons are now well beyond
capacity.163
South Africa’s recent history of apartheid and widespread inequality and exclusion make it difficult to isolate the effects of collateral consequences.164 As one commentator has observed, “The notion
of offender reintegration in South Africa society is conceptually challenging when considered against the background of widespread exclusion, marginalisation and inequality.”165
Despite these methodological challenges, a comparative analysis
of U.S. and South African collateral consequences can still be illuminating. Like formerly incarcerated individuals in the United States,
South Africans who are released from incarceration confront significant civil disabilities upon reentry. As in the United States, the recidivism rate in South Africa is high, with estimates running up to eighty
159 See Steve Pete, Prisoners’ Rights, in 7 SOUTH AFRICA HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK
1996, at 231–32 (1998) (discussing how fear of crime led to emphasis on “retribution, incapacitation and deterrence”); see also Paul van Zyl Smit, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice:
The Case of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 647, 652
(1999) (noting “a collapse in the capacity of the police to investigate and arrest, attorneys
general to prosecute, judges to convict and correctional facilities to imprison” for “crimes
such as murder, armed robbery, rape and serious assaults”).
160 Pete, supra note 159, at 231–32.
161 CAVADINO & DIGNAN, supra note 14, at 94.
162 See id. at 95–96.
163 Jones, supra note 86, at 5.
164 See LUKAS MUNTINGH, INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES & CIVIL SOC’Y PRISON REFORM
INITIATIVE, A SOCIETAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS
IN PRISONER SUPPORT, REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION 1 (2008), available at
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/civil-society-prison-reform-initiative/
publications-1/cspri-publications/SOCIETALRESPONSIBILITYREPORT.pdf (noting
difficulty with considering offender reintegration in South African society due to widespread inequality); see also Julie Berg & Wilfried Schärf, Crime Statistics in South Africa
1994–2003, 17 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 57, 66 (2004) (discussing “rising levels” of unemployment in mid-1990s to early 2000s and “economic deprivation and inequalities” in South
Africa).
165 MUNTINGH, supra note 164, at 1.
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percent.166 Given these extraordinary recidivism problems, scholars
and journalists in South Africa have called attention to the plight of
those with criminal records. Specifically, they have written about the
lack of services available to individuals upon reentry as well as the
effects of collateral consequences on these individuals.167 South Africa
has numerous reentry-related organizations that work with individuals
upon their release from incarceration,168 and its Department of
Correctional Services has implemented programs geared toward
reintegration.169
Moreover, like the United States, Canada, and England, South
Africa has historically disproportionately incarcerated members of
certain racial groups, specifically Africans and Coloureds.170 Furthermore, Coloureds are still disproportionately incarcerated in South
Africa; in fact, as of October 2007, Coloureds were incarcerated at a
higher rate than Africans. At that time, Africans constituted approximately eighty percent of the prison population, but were also eighty
percent of the South African general population,171 while Coloureds
were incarcerated at approximately twice their representation in the
general population.172

166 Lavern De Vries, Huge Cash Boost for Anti-crime Drive: Nicro’s ‘Alternative Sentencing Programme’ Aims To Slash Nation’s 80% Recidivism Rate, THE ARGUS (Cape
Town, S. Afr.), Feb. 19, 2009, at 3.
167 See, e.g., MUNTINGH, supra note 86, at 55 (noting that reintegration programs in
South Africa are “isolated” and not “comprehensive”); van Zyl Smit, supra note 73, at
260–61 (“The existing legal disabilities of former prisoners mostly affect their right to certain types of employment.”).
168 See MUNTINGH, supra note 164, at 4–8 (describing services offered by several reentry
organizations in South Africa).
169 See DEP’T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES (S. AFR.), ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE 2007/
08 FINANCIAL YEAR, at 70–72 (2008), available at http://www-dcs.pwv.gov.za/Publications/
Annual%20Reports/DCS%20Annual%20Report%202008.pdf (describing Social Reintegration Programme).
170 See Ogletree, supra note 155, at 10–15 (providing history of South Africa’s
Apartheid criminal justice system and explaining that “criminal defendants were disproportionately black”); see also Dirk van Zyl Smit, South Africa, in IMPRISONMENT TODAY
AND TOMORROW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS’ RIGHTS AND PRISON
CONDITIONS 589, 605–06 (Dirk van Zyl Smit & Frieder Dunkel eds., 2d ed. 2001) (noting
that in 1976 Blacks were imprisoned at rate more than four times greater than Whites, and
Coloureds were imprisoned at a rate more than nine times greater than Whites).
171 S. AFRICAN INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, SOUTH AFRICA SURVEY 2007/2008, at 6, 609
(2008).
172 Id.
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II
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE COMPARISON COUNTRIES
A. Severity of Collateral Consequences
Individuals with criminal records in the United States and the
Comparison Countries confront collateral consequences to varying
degrees. This Part explores the respective severity of these consequences, first in the United States and then in the Comparison
Countries.
1. United States
Collateral consequences in the United States have garnered
extensive attention over the past decade.173 In the early years of the
American Republic, collateral consequences were very severe by
modern standards.174 These consequences decreased in severity
during the 1960s and 1970s175 before expanding again both in number
and scope starting in the early 1980s.176 As a result of this most recent
expansion, collateral consequences now dramatically impact the lives
of many individuals with criminal records, making successful reintegration into society more difficult than ever.
Collateral consequences have been codified in federal, state, and
local statutory and regulatory schemes, with the consequences varying
widely between, and even within, the states.177 The difficulties in
quantifying the full range of these consequences, especially those at
173

See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra
note 137, at 15, 17–18 (observing that early American legislatures “den[ied] convicted
offenders the right to enter into contracts, automatically dissolv[ed] their marriages, and
barr[ed] them from a wide variety of jobs and benefits”).
175 See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 155 (1999) (noting that
decline in collateral consequences statutes in 1960s and 1970s stemmed from efforts in
1950s “to improve the post-release situation of ex-offenders”).
176 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
177 See Nora V. Demleitner, Smart Public Policy: Replacing Imprisonment with Targeted
Nonprison Sentences and Collateral Sanctions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 339, 357–58 (2005)
(arguing that as result of “the panoply of state-imposed collateral sanctions that vary dramatically, federal convictions have an inherently inequitable impact on offenders”). The
Legal Action Center issued a report in 2004 that provided a state-by-state account of collateral consequences. LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY: A
REPORT ON STATE LEGAL BARRIERS FACING PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS (2004),
available at http://hirenetwork.org/pdfs/LAC_PrintReport.pdf. Although slightly outdated
at this point, the report provides some idea of the variance among the states.
174
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state and local levels,178 pose particular problems for analyzing their
scope. Because of this local variation, one must be careful when generalizing about the nature and scope of collateral consequences in the
United States for purposes of international comparison.
Despite these local differences, broad exploration of the legal
hurdles confronting individuals with criminal records is nonetheless
possible because many collateral consequences are rooted in federal
law. While these laws for the most part provide discretion to state
governments and local agencies to opt out of certain consequences or
to broaden or narrow their scope,179 federally imposed financial and
political incentives encourage their adoption.180
Below is a brief overview of some of the most prominent consequences in the United States: exclusion from public or governmentassisted housing, employment-related legal barriers, ineligibility for
public benefits, and felon disenfranchisement.181
178 See Demleitner, supra note 175, at 154 (explaining that collateral consequences are
“scattered throughout different bodies of law”). For a description of the variance between
states regarding collateral consequences, see LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 177.
179 For instance, states can opt out of the federal law barring individuals convicted of
felony drug offenses from receiving federal welfare benefits. See infra notes 201–03 and
accompanying text. Similarly, while federal law bans individuals convicted of specific
offenses from public housing premises, it provides that local housing authorities may
define the scope of criminal activity that disqualifies individuals from their respective
housing facilities. See infra notes 182–88 and accompanying text.
180 For example, federal funding for local public housing authorities is conditioned upon
barring individuals who engage in certain criminal activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(l)(6),
1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii), 1437f(o)(6)(C)–(7)(D) (2006).
181 Deportation of noncitizens convicted of criminal offenses is also considered to be
among the most drastic collateral consequences in the United States. See Padilla v.
Kentucky, No. 08-651, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2010). Recognizing this harsh result,
several state statutes require judges to inform noncitizen defendants of possible deportation consequences during the guilty plea process. See Pinard, supra note 41, at 644 n.126
(listing such statutes). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared that defense
counsel has a duty to warn the defendant about the possible deportation consequences of a
guilty plea. Padilla, slip op. at 17. Counsel’s failure to do so can be grounds for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The Court’s reasoning rested in part on the particular
“seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant
impact of deportation on families living lawfully in [the United States].” Id. This Article
does not analyze deportation precisely because it has already received extensive scholarly
and judicial attention. See, e.g., Tyler Atkins, Note, Immigration Consequences of Guilty
Pleas: What State v. Paredez Means to New Mexico Criminal Defendants and Defense
Attorneys, 36 N.M. L. REV. 603 (2006) (discussing case holding that defense counsel’s
failure to inform clients about immigration consequences of guilty pleas was considered
ineffective assistance of counsel); Attila Bogdan, Guilty Pleas by Non-Citizens in Illinois:
Immigration Consequences Reconsidered, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 19 (2003) (urging defense
attorneys to advise clients of immigration consequences that follow guilty pleas); John J.
Francis, Failure To Advise Non-Citizens of Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Should This Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 691 (2003) (arguing that courts should advise noncitizen criminal defendants that
entering guilty plea could adversely impact their ability to remain in United States).
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a. Housing
The U.S. federal government imposes restrictions on individuals
with certain criminal records from receiving public housing assistance.
For instance, federal law bans registered sex offenders and convicted
methamphetamine producers from obtaining government-assisted
housing for life.182 Federal law also grants local public housing authorities broad discretion to determine the scope of other criminal activity
that will disqualify individuals from public housing.183 Local housing
authorities across the United States have expanded the types of conduct that will preclude individuals from obtaining public housing.184
The lengths of these bans often differ by the type of conduct. For
example, felony convictions typically lead to longer exclusionary
periods than misdemeanors.185 In addition, several housing authorities
ban individuals whose conduct did not lead to a conviction, such as
individuals who received violations or other noncriminal dispositions.186 While some jurisdictions, including New York City, allow oth182 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a) (2006) (banning sex offenders who are subject to lifetime registration requirements); 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(i)(A) (2008) (banning individuals convicted
of manufacturing or producing methamphetamine on premises of federal housing). For an
overview of the federal housing laws relating to individuals with criminal records, see
Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing–Denial of Benefits to Drug
Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 137, at 37, 43–46.
183 See 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2006) (granting authority to public housing agencies to
deny admission to applicants who have “engaged in any drug-related or violent criminal
activity or other criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents”); id. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2006)
(declaring that criminal activity of tenant, member of tenant’s household, or anyone
“under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy”).
184 See e.g., Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied
Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 566–69 (2005) (discussing local measures excluding prospective tenants based on prior arrests and minor and/or nonviolent
offenses); see also Rubinstein & Mukamal, supra note 182, at 45–46 (noting that local
agencies have discretion to deny housing for any “drug-related or violent criminal activity
or any other criminal activity that would adversely affect the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents if the criminal activity occurred a
‘reasonable’ time before the person seeks admission”).
185 E.g., HOUS. AUTH. OF BALT. CITY, 3 ANNUAL PLAN FISCAL YEAR 2010: THE PUBLIC
HOUSING ADMISSIONS & CONTINUED OCCUPANCY POLICY 2–9 (2009), available at
http://static.baltimorehousing.org/pdf/vol3_fy2010.pdf (noting that Housing Authority of
Baltimore City “will deny eligibility for admission [into public housing] based upon felony
or misdemeanor convictions for a period of no more than 18 months for a misdemeanor
offense and three years for a felony offense beginning on the date of conviction or the
release from incarceration, whichever date is later”).
186 See, e.g., Carey, supra note 184, at 566 (explaining that many housing authorities
exclude individuals solely on arrest records “even if the charges were ultimately
dropped”); Smyth, supra note 9, at 482 (noting that pleading guilty to noncriminal disorderly conduct offense in New York “makes a person presumptively ineligible for New York
City public housing for two years”).
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erwise ineligible individuals to reside in public housing or receive
housing assistance within the exclusionary period upon a showing of
rehabilitation,187 other jurisdictions provide no exceptions, and individuals must wait out the entire exclusionary period before becoming
eligible for public housing.188
b. Employment
“In most jurisdictions, the stigma [of a criminal record] takes on a
legal significance” in the employment context.189 Individuals with
criminal records confront numerous federal and state employment
restrictions190 in both the public and private sectors.191 Federal and
state laws and regulations impose collateral employment consequences through various mechanisms, including statutory prohibitions, licensing provisions, and statutorily required background
checks.192
For example, an individual with a criminal conviction will no
longer be eligible for numerous categories of employment.193 Additional employment consequences are enforced by licensing agencies.194 Scores of jobs require occupational licenses,195 and state and
187 NEW YORK CITY HOUS. AUTH., DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING APPLICATIONS MANUAL
21 (2001), available at http://www.reentry.net/ny/library/attachment.97782 (explaining that
finding of ineligibility is reversible if housing applicant “presents substantial evidence to
indicate a reasonable probability that the offending person’s future behavior will not
adversely affect the safety, or welfare of other tenants, or [Housing] Authority staff”).
188 Carey, supra note 184, at 572–73.
189 WESTERN, supra note 30, at 112.
190 Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7
J.L. SOC’Y 18, 23 (2005). For an overview of federally imposed employment restrictions,
see AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIM. SANCTIONS & PUB. DEFENDER SERV.
FOR D.C., INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN FEDERAL
LAWS AND REGULATIONS 19–33 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/cecs/
internalexile.pdf [hereinafter INTERNAL EXILE]. For an overview of employment-related
restrictions imposed by states, see LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 177, at 10.
191 PAGER, supra note 7, at 33. In addition to these legal restrictions, individuals with
criminal records also face discrimination in hiring by the private sector. See generally
Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black
and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195
(2009).
192 See PAGER, supra note 7, at 33 (discussing state and federal statutory prohibitions
and licensing restrictions); INTERNAL EXILE, supra note 190, at 19–37 (describing federal
restrictions on employment and licensing and explaining federal background check
requirements).
193 See PAGER, supra note 7, at 33 (“In some states, for example, ex-offenders are
restricted from jobs as septic tank cleaners, embalmers, billiard room employees, real
estate agents, plumbers, eyeglass dispensers, and barbers.”).
194 THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 110 (“[E]x-offenders face a wide array of licensing
barriers that have [a] . . . devastating impact on their ability to gain employment.”).
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municipal licensing agencies often have authority to conduct background checks with discretion to deny licenses based on an applicant’s
criminal history.196
Theoretically, these consequences should be attenuated by fed197
eral
and, in some cases, state antidiscrimination statutes, which
afford statutory antidiscrimination protections to individuals with
criminal records.198 While many of these statutes only pertain to
public employment or licensing authorities, a few extend to the private sector as well.199 However, as some commentators have
observed, these laws generally have weak enforcement mechanisms.200 As a result, despite these statutory protections, criminal
195 For instance, in Maryland over 500 jobs require licenses. See MD. INST. FOR
CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. OF LAWYERS, INC., MARYLAND TRIAL JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK
149–97 (1999) (listing such occupations, which include electricians, massage therapists,
retail merchants, and security guards).
196 See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of
Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 527, 536–37 (2006) (providing examples of occupational licensing laws in
several states that bar or limit employment opportunities for individuals with criminal
records).
197 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to show a “business
necessity” for refusing to hire an individual because of his or her criminal record. See
Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding railroad’s blanket
refusal to hire applicants with conviction for any offense other than minor traffic offense
had racially disparate impact and was not justified by business necessity). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has articulated a three-factor test for whether an
employer’s decision was justified by business necessity: (1) “the nature and gravity of the
offense”; (2) “the time that has passed since the conviction”; and (3) “the nature of the
job.” EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF
CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS
AMENDED, 42 U.S.C. § 2000E ET SEQ. (1982) (Feb. 4, 1987), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/convict1.html.
198 MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 62 (2006) (noting that
approximately two-thirds of states “have general laws that prohibit firing or refusal to hire
and/or issue a professional or occupational license to a person ‘solely’ because of a criminal
record”); PAGER, supra note 7, at 37 (explaining that several states passed antidiscrimination legislation for individuals convicted of criminal offenses in 1960s and 1970s out of
“concern[ ] about the lingering stigma attached to ex-offenders”).
199 See LOVE, supra note 198, at 64 (noting that only four states—Hawaii, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—have “comprehensive laws that regulate consideration of a
conviction in public and private employment and occupational licensure”); THOMPSON,
supra note 67, at 115–16 (describing employment discrimination protections that Hawaii,
Wisconsin, and New York provide to ex-offenders); Christine Neylon O’Brien & Jonathan
J. Darrow, Adverse Employment Consequences Triggered by Criminal Convictions: Recent
Cases Interpret State Statutes Prohibiting Discrimination, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 991,
995–96 (2007) (describing range of state antidiscrimination statutes).
200 LOVE, supra note 198, at 63 (“Few states have any mechanism for enforcement of
their nondiscrimination laws, and it is not clear how effective they are.”).
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records often bar individuals with criminal records from meaningful
employment opportunities.
c. Public Benefits
Most criminal convictions do not have an effect on an individual’s
eligibility for federal welfare benefits. However, since 1996, federal
law has denied welfare benefits assistance (cash assistance and food
stamps) to individuals convicted of felony drug offenses.201 States can
opt out of this law,202 and many have. Currently, fourteen states have
adhered to the federal ban and as a result completely exclude individuals convicted of felony drug offenses from these benefits; twenty-two
states enforce the ban in part; and fourteen states and the District of
Columbia have opted out of the ban entirely.203
d. Voting
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared voting restrictions based
on convictions permissible under Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.204 Such restrictions, both with respect to federal and
state elections, are matters of state law.205 Forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia ban individuals who are incarcerated for felony
offenses from voting; thirty-five states ban individuals on parole for a
felony offense from voting; and thirty states ban individuals on felony
probation from voting.206 Two states, Virginia and Kentucky, impose
lifetime exclusions for individuals convicted of felony offenses.207
201 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2006) (denying assistance and benefits to individuals convicted of
felony drug offenses).
202 Id. § 862a(d)(1)(A); see also THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION,
SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS
125 (2008), available at http://2009transition.org/criminaljustice/index.php?option=com_
docman&task=doc_download&gid=10&Itemid.
203 Id.
204 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (providing for proportional reduction in congressional representation for states that deny their male inhabitants right to vote on any basis
“except for participation in rebellion, or other crime”) (emphasis added). In Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974), the Court found that this provision created an “affirmative
sanction” for state felon disenfranchisement laws. Such restrictions are permissible as long
as they do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (holding that Alabama’s disenfranchisement law violated Fourteenth Amendment because it “was enacted with the intent of disenfranchising blacks”).
205 For an overview of the various state disenfranchisement laws, see THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (2008),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_bs_fdlawsinus.pdf [hereinafter
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS].
206 Id. at 1.
207 Id. at 3.
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2. England
As in the United States, formerly incarcerated individuals in
England face numerous obstacles upon reentry. While individuals in
England can be disqualified from receiving public benefits because of
a criminal conviction, the set of disqualifying crimes is narrower in
scope than the broad array of drug-related crimes that can disqualify
individuals in the United States from receiving these benefits. Also,
the disqualifications in England are temporary, in contrast to the lifetime bans imposed upon individuals convicted of felony drug offenses
in some American jurisdictions. England also has less restrictive felon
disenfranchisement laws than the United States. As explained below,
the most significant collateral consequences for offenders in England
relate to employment and housing, but even these consequences are
less severe than those in the United States.208
Many former offenders in England have difficulty securing
employment because of their criminal records.209 Some of these
employment hurdles result from English laws that permit professional
and trade associations to make rules that exclude individuals with
criminal records.210 These legal barriers to employment have been
tied to England’s high recidivism rates,211 and various mechanisms
have been implemented or proposed to increase the availability of
employment opportunities for former offenders.212
In the aggregate, however, employment-related collateral consequences are less severe in England than in the United States. The vast
majority of employment-related barriers for formerly incarcerated
208 Commentators and studies have explained that housing and employment are the
most substantial barriers to successful reentry for formerly incarcerated individuals in
England. See, e.g., VIVIEN STERN, BRICKS OF SHAME: BRITAIN’S PRISONS 54 (1989) (noting
that prison record presents obstacles to obtaining employment and that housing very often
is lost as result of incarceration); see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS. (U.K.), JUSTICE FOR ALL
109 (2002), available at http://www.cjsonline.gov.uk/downloads/application/pdf/
CJS%20White%20Paper%20-%20Justice%20For%20All.pdf (noting that employment
and stable housing significantly reduce reoffending and reconviction rates).
209 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS. (U.K.), supra note 208, at 111.
210 See Hirsch & Wasik, supra note 34, at 603 (providing examples of regulatory bodies
that have been granted such powers). Hirsch and Wasik note that “[w]ide discretion is
granted in the exercise of these powers, with which the courts will rarely interfere.” Id.
211 See RUSSELL WEBSTER ET AL., HOME OFFICE RESEARCH, DEV. & STATISTICS
DIRECTORATE (U.K.), RES. STUDY NO. 226, BUILDING BRIDGES TO EMPLOYMENT FOR
PRISONERS 8 (2001), http://unlock.org.uk/upload_pdf/Building%20bridges%20to%20
employment%20for%20prisoners.pdf (“Several studies support the idea that unemployment is related to continuing to offend . . . .”).
212 See, e.g., Terry Macalister, Give a Prisoner a Job, Get a Natural Entrepreneur: Governor Says Companies Can Solve Jail Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 8, 2005, at 22
(reporting that governor of Brixton’s prison urged employers to hire individuals with criminal records, both to reduce recidivism and to ease jail overcrowding).
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individuals in England are tied to the availability of resources, the lack
of employment-related qualifications among these individuals, or to
the informal stigma that these individuals confront when seeking
employment.213 Studies and polls in England indicate the extent to
which employers are reluctant to hire individuals with criminal
records.214 As a result, the various reentry-related service providers
focus specifically on trying to secure employment for these
individuals.
Individuals in England are entitled to receive a housing benefit
that provides financial assistance to help pay rent.215 However, entitlement to the benefit “stops for all sentenced prisoners expected to be
in prison for more than 13 weeks.”216 This loss is quite significant
because a majority of prisoners rely on the housing benefit to help
cover their rent before entering custody217 and because individuals
exiting custody are often severely constrained by a lack of financial
resources and have difficulties securing employment.218 Thus, the
practical effect of this housing policy is to render many individuals
unable to obtain housing upon release from custody.
England restricts eligibility for welfare benefits only based on
criminal convictions for welfare fraud offenses.219 Individuals with
drug or other convictions remain eligible for these benefits. Unlike the
United States’ lifetime welfare ban on individuals convicted of felony
drug offenses, England’s disqualification from welfare benefits lasts
for the four-week period immediately following conviction.220
Former prisoners can also receive various other forms of welfare
benefits, including a Job Seekers Allowance and emergency Crisis
213 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 211, at 1 (“Ex-offenders face many difficulties when
seeking employment[,] including poor reading, writing and numeracy skills; behavioural
and health problems; debt and homelessness; as well as discrimination from employers.”);
Julie Vennard & Carol Hedderman, Helping Offenders into Employment: How Far Is Voluntary Sector Expertise Valued in a Contracting-Out Environment?, 9 CRIMINOLOGY &
CRIM. JUST. 225, 227 (2009) (“A criminal record itself creates a barrier to employment, but
also the majority of offenders lack skills and qualifications and have a poor work history.”).
214 See DEL ROY FLETCHER ET AL., RECRUITING AND EMPLOYING OFFENDERS 11
(2001) (noting that majority of employers surveyed had “formal or informal policy on
recruiting people with criminal records,” with many of these policies “restrict[ing] the
recruitment of offenders”); Ex-offenders ‘Face Jobs Struggle,’ supra note 74 (reporting poll
in which thirty-seven percent of British employers responded that they would not hire
individual with criminal record).
215 See PRISON REFORM TRUST, supra note 129, at 32.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See Stern, supra note 208, at 54 (discussing the difficulties faced by individuals with
prison records who are seeking employment).
219 Welfare Reform Act, 2009, c. 24, § 24(1) (Eng.).
220 Id.
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Loans.221 Approximately eighty percent of former prisoners qualify
and apply for these benefits upon release,222 but there are significant
logistical hurdles to securing these benefits, such that there is often a
long delay between when a former prisoner applies for the benefits
and when he or she actually starts receiving them. This “prisoner
finance gap” has been identified as a key resettlement issue.223
Prisoner disenfranchisement has strong roots in English law,224
and convicted prisoners incarcerated in England (as well as the rest of
the United Kingdom) cannot vote during the period of their incarceration.225 As in the United States, disenfranchisement in England is not
“part and parcel of formal sentencing as it may not be factored in or
out of a prison term.”226 Unlike most U.S. states, the United Kingdom
restores to individuals the right to vote immediately upon release
from incarceration.227
The European Court of Human Rights recently declared that
Britain’s blanket ban on voting by the incarcerated violates the
European Convention of Human Rights.228 In response to this ruling,
the United Kingdom has “embark[ed] on a . . . consultation process to
find a solution [to comply with the court ruling] which would command support in Parliament.”229 Thus, it is possible that in the future,
England will grant the right to vote to an even broader group of individuals convicted of crimes.
221 PRISON REFORM WORKING GROUP, THE CTR. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, LOCKED UP
POTENTIAL: A STRATEGY FOR REFORMING PRISONS AND REHABILITATING PRISONERS
200–01 (2009), available at http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/client/downloads/
CSJLockedUpPotentialFULLREPORT.pdf. However, individuals can receive a “benefit
sanction” of one week if they are convicted or cautioned for violent or threatening
behavior against the agency staff responsible for handling their benefits claim. Welfare
Reform Act § 25(2).
222 PRISON REFORM WORKING GROUP, supra note 221, at 200.
223 Id. at 200–02.
224 Susan Easton, Electing the Electorate: The Problem of Prisoner Disenfranchisement,
69 MODERN L. REV. 443, 443 (2006) (tracing English disenfranchisement to ancient Greek
and Roman law, as well as medieval notions of civil death).
225 Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.).
226 Robert Jago & Jane Marriott, Citizenship or Civic Death? Extending the Franchise to
Convicted Prisoners, 5 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2007), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/
2007/issue5/jago5.html.
227 Id.
228 See infra notes 397–406 and accompanying text (discussing Hirst v. United Kingdom
(No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187).
229 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (U.K.), VOTING RIGHTS OF CONVICTED PRISONERS DETAINED
WITHIN THE UNITED KINGDOM: SECOND STAGE CONSULTATION 7 (2009). The first stage of
the consultation process involved a questionnaire that sought responses to various ideas
about methods of enfranchising prisoners, including limiting the ban to individuals serving
sentences of particular lengths. However, the questionnaire garnered a “relatively small
number of respondents,” whose opinions “were sharply divided.” Id.
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3. Canada
Collateral consequences in Canada are generally less severe than
in the United States: Canada does not disenfranchise individuals convicted of crimes, nor does it restrict eligibility for public housing on
the basis of criminal convictions. Canada does prohibit parolees and
individuals subject to long-term supervision from obtaining welfare
benefits, but it does not limit the eligibility of others convicted of
crimes. Like the United States, however, Canada does impose significant restrictions on the employment opportunities of individuals convicted of crimes.230
Collateral consequences in Canada are particularly problematic
for convicted individuals who serve a sentence of incarceration and
who are then released on parole or long-term supervision. Such individuals cannot access social welfare benefits at all because they are
technically considered to be under the auspices of the correctional
system.231 However, these individuals are able to access such benefits
upon completing their parole or long-term supervision.232
Former prisoners in Canada confront pronounced practical difficulties in obtaining housing. As in the other Comparison Countries,
Canadian ex-prisoners often lack the financial resources necessary to
pay for housing.233 Moreover, “in most provinces, landlords can
legally discriminate against those with criminal records.”234 Public, or
subsidized, housing is often not an option because of long waiting
lists.235 However, it is important to note that these obstacles are not
the result of exclusionary laws.236 Rather, they are tied mainly to exprisoners’ inadequate resources and the refusal of landlords to rent to
individuals with criminal records. As defined above, these are
informal consequences, as opposed to the formal consequences of
U.S. laws that specifically bar individuals with criminal records from
living in public housing.237
230

See infra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
Telephone Interview with Renée Collette, Executive Vice-Chairperson, Can. Nat’l
Parole Bd. (Jan. 16, 2009) (interview notes on file with the New York University Law
Review).
232 Id.
233 CAN. MORTGAGE & HOUS. CORP., HOUSING OPTIONS UPON DISCHARGE FROM
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (2007), http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/odpub/pdf/65340.pdf?fr=12
68066207578.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
231
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Canadian prisoners retain the right to vote during and after their
incarceration. In Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),238 the
Canadian Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, overturned a law that
denied the right to vote to individuals sentenced to more than two
years of imprisonment. While the Court offered several reasons for
striking down the law, it broadly declared disenfranchisement to be
“inconsistent with the respect for the dignity of every person that lies
at the heart of Canadian democracy and the [Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms].”239 The Court opined that disenfranchisement
further isolates prisoners from society and “undermines correctional
law and policy directed towards rehabilitation and integration.”240 It
also noted that allowing prisoners to vote would help teach them
“democratic values and social responsibility.”241
Canada is similar to the United States in one regard: It imposes
broad employment restrictions on individuals with criminal records.
There are several jobs in Canada that require criminal background
checks, including any job involving the supervision of children242 or
social work, or any job within an educational institution, law enforcement, health care, and taxi driving.243
In all other respects—housing, welfare benefits, and the right to
vote—Canada imposes much less severe collateral consequences than
the United States. Moreover, where it does impose restrictions,
Canada couches its punishment policies specifically in the concept of
maintaining the human dignity of prisoners and ex-prisoners.
4. South Africa
The move toward democracy brought spirited optimism to South
Africa, as well as broad reforms to its criminal justice system.244 Nonetheless, individuals with criminal records in post-apartheid South
Africa continue to face significant legal disabilities. These disabilities,
combined with the dire economic conditions in South Africa,245 create
238

[2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.).
Id. at 522.
240 Id. at 523.
241 Id. at 547.
242 See CRIMINAL RECORDS REVIEW ACT, 1996 R.S.B.C., ch. 86, § 8(1) (Can.) (“An
employer must ensure that every individual who is hired for employment involving work
with children and every employee who works with children undergoes a criminal record
check in accordance with this Part.”).
243 See THE NAT’L PARDON CTR., EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS, http://www.national
pardon.org/NPC_employmentrestrictions.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (listing careers
requiring background checks).
244 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
245 For instance, the unemployment rate in South Africa has fluctuated between approximately twenty to thirty percent from 2000 to 2007. STATISTICS S. AFR., LABOR FORCE
239
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tremendous obstacles to successful reentry, which in turn contribute
to South Africa’s high recidivism rate.246
As in the United States, the scope and extent of collateral consequences in South Africa have been largely ignored until recently.247
However, scholars and service providers in South Africa have begun
to devote attention to these consequences248 and to the related issue
of the provision of services to facilitate reentry.249
The research conducted for this Article has not uncovered collateral consequences in South Africa related to housing restrictions or
other forms of government assistance. Rather, the most significant
collateral consequences in South Africa affect various types of
employment. For instance, individuals with convictions can be prohibited from working as private security officers250 or police officers251
and from continuing to serve on regulatory bodies.252
While South Africans with criminal records face enormous
reentry barriers as a result of both collateral consequences and the
harsh economic conditions noted above, they enjoy constitutional
rights that are not recognized for their counterparts in the United
States.253 Dignity is a foundational principle of South Africa’s
Constitution, set forth in large measure to respond to the country’s
SURVEY: HISTORICAL REVISION, SEPTEMBER SERIES, 2000 TO 2007, at 6–7 (2009), available
at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0210/P0210September2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,
2005,2006,2007.pdf.
246 See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text.
247 van Zyl Smit, supra note 73, at 263 (“There has been no systematic review in South
Africa of the legal disabilities that various laws have imposed on former offenders.”).
248 See, e.g., B.C. Naudé, The Pardoning Power as a Duty of Justice, 15 S. AFR. J. CRIM.
JUST. 159, 167 (2002) (listing various restrictions persons with criminal records face in
South Africa).
249 See, e.g., MUNTINGH, supra note 164 (analyzing results of surveys of twenty-one
organizations supporting prisoners and assisting offender reintegration).
250 See Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 s. 23(1)(d) (S. Afr.) (barring
from registration as security service provider any person who was “found guilty of [certain]
offence[s] . . . within a period of 10 years immediately before the[ir] application”).
251 Specifically, a person applying to the South African Police must “have no previous
criminal convictions.” Regulations for the South African Police (GN) R1599/2002
§ 11(1)(a)(xii) (S. Afr.). However, this prohibition is not absolute, as “the National
Commissioner may in his or her discretion and in exceptional circumstances, waive any of
the requirements where and if such waiver will be in the interest of the Service.” Id.
§ 11(2).
252 See, e.g., Social Housing Act 16 of 2008 s. 9(7)(d) (S. Afr.) (“A member of the
Council [of the Social Housing Regulatory Authority] ceases to be a member if . . . he or
she is convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a
fine.”). Individuals with convictions can also be prohibited from securing a firearm license.
See Naudé, supra note 248, at 167.
253 At least one commentator expresses the view that South Africa’s relatively new
constitution “suppl[ies] the basis for asserting the rights of former prisoners in a way that
could diminish their civil disabilities.” van Zyl Smit, supra note 73, at 256.
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history of apartheid.254 The Bill of Rights in South Africa’s recently
enacted Constitution, for example, requires that all individuals be
treated with “inherent dignity.”255 South African courts have invoked
this foundational principle in various contexts, including incarceration.
Perhaps the best illustration of the connection between the principle
of dignity and individuals with criminal records is found in the voting
rights context. In 2004, the South African Constitutional Court held
that prisoners cannot be denied the right to vote by reason of their
incarceration.256 In so holding, the Court struck down as unconstitutional an election law that disenfranchised individuals who were
sentenced to imprisonment without the option of paying a fine.257
As a result, while South Africa shares many of the same recidivism problems as the United States and has some similar collateral
consequences—specifically related to loss of employment
opportunities—South Africa still has fewer collateral consequences
overall than the United States, as exhibited by the ban on felon and
prisoner disenfranchisement.
5. Summary
The preceding comparative examination reveals that the United
States imposes collateral consequences that are harsher and more
pervasive than those in England, Canada, and South Africa. These
consequences in the United States impact many aspects of formerly
incarcerated individuals’ lives: housing, employment, the ability of
individuals to sustain themselves and their families, and civic inclusion. For instance, unlike the Comparison Countries, many jurisdictions in the United States deny welfare benefits to individuals
convicted of drug offenses and disenfranchise individuals postincarceration. As a result, a criminal record in the United States
inflicts a greater degree of legal stigma than does one in England,

254 See Lourens W.H. Ackerman, The Legal Nature of the South African Constitutional
Revolution, 2004 N.Z. L. REV. 633, 644 (2004) (“In interpreting the Constitution, and
particular provisions thereof, it is permissible and indeed necessary to look at the ills of the
past that they seek to rectify and in this way try to establish what equality and dignity mean
in the relevant provisions.”).
255 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 10 (“Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to
have their dignity respected and protected.”).
256 Minister of Home Affairs v Nat’l Instit. for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of
Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) at 281–83 (S. Afr.).
257 Id. at 283. In addition, the Court rejected arguments that extending the franchise to
this group of prisoners would be logistically difficult and expensive. Id. at 297–98.
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Canada, or South Africa,258 and individuals in the United States must
confront significantly more post-incarceration legal obstacles.
B. A Comparative View of the Permanence of Criminal Convictions
All four of the countries surveyed in this Article have legal measures that lessen the sting of a criminal record. However, in England,
Canada, and South Africa, these measures are more broadly available
and more easily accessible than in the United States. Thus, individuals
incarcerated in the United States face not only more severe collateral
consequences, but they also have much more difficulty obtaining relief
from those consequences.
In England, the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act allows an individual to expunge his or her conviction in certain circumstances.259 To
be eligible, the individual must not have been sentenced to more than
thirty months in prison260 and must have made it through the applicable rehabilitation period without reoffending.261 After that time, the
criminal record becomes “spent” and the individual “shall . . . be
treated as a rehabilitated person,”262 meaning that he or she “shall be
treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or
been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for
the offence or offences which were the subject of that conviction.”263
England’s Rehabilitation of Offenders Act also alleviates
employment-related barriers for individuals with criminal records, as
they are not required to disclose their “spent” convictions to potential
258 See Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 617, 620 (noting that unlike other forms of social stigma, “criminal stigma has the
added dimension of formalized legal status”).
259 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974, c. 53 (Eng.).
260 Id. § 5(1)(b). The Act has been criticized for excluding the large number of individuals sentenced to thirty months or more in custody. See DEL ROY FLETCHER ET AL., supra
note 214, at 2 (arguing that thirty month cutoff “contrasts with practice in most other European countries where all criminal convictions can become spent after the relevant rehabilitation period”); Jonathan Aitken, Comment & Debate: A Second Chance, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), June 8, 2009, at 28 (“Such an arbitrary cut-off period is irrational in today’s world
of ever-lengthening sentences.”).
261 For instance, the rehabilitation period for a person sentenced to six months or less is
seven years from the conviction date. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act § 5(2) tbl.A. The
rehabilitation period for a person sentenced to more than six months is ten years. Id. Individuals seeking employment within these waiting periods must disclose their criminal
record to potential employers. Id. § 4(3)(b). These “disclosure periods have been criticised
as complicated and excessively long.” CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS. (U.K.), supra note 208, at
111.
262 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act § 1(1).
263 Id. § 4(1). One commentator has described this Act as “legal rebiographing,”
because it allows an individual to “rewrite his or her history to make it more in line with his
or her present, reformed identity.” SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS
REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR LIVES 164 (2001).
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employers.264 Employers, in turn, are not allowed to use spent convictions, or the individual’s failure to disclose such convictions, as a
reason to fire or refuse to hire such individuals.265 However, the Act
has exceptions that require disclosure for certain types of employment, such as teaching and social work,266 and the Act has been
amended several times to expand the types of employment that
require such disclosure of spent convictions.267
In Canada, large segments of the formerly incarcerated population are eligible to have their criminal record pardoned or sealed.268
These individuals can have their convictions “set[ ] aside” by applying
to the National Parole Board for a pardon,269 which is defined as the
“formal attempt to remove a stigma for people found guilty of a
federal offence who, having satisfied the sentence imposed and a specific waiting period, have shown themselves to be responsible citizens.”270 It is available to individuals convicted of both summary
(misdemeanor) offenses and indictable (felony) offenses as long as
they remain crime-free for a specific amount of time.271
Pardons are granted routinely to individuals who satisfy the
various requirements. A recent study found that from 1996 to 2003,
264

Rehabilitation of Offenders Act § 4(3)(b).
Id.
266 See Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order, 1975, S.I. 1975/1023,
sched. 1 (U.K.). The types of employment that require applicants to disclose spent convictions include school teachers, youth and social workers, social services providers to the
elderly and mentally or physically disabled, and police/probation officers. Id. The legal and
medical professions also require applicants to disclose these convictions during the admissions process. Id.
267 For instance, the Act was amended in 2007 to add exceptions for several professions
where individuals would have access to personal information relating to children or would
otherwise work with children or “vulnerable adults.” The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
1974 (Exceptions) (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order, 2007, S.I. 2007/2149, § 7
(U.K.). The 2007 amendments also apply to individuals seeking employment with the
Gambling Commission, seeking to become “authorised search officers,” or seeking
employment that involves working in a supervisory capacity with “persons aged under 18
serving in the naval, military or air forces of the Crown.” Id.
268 See Ruddell & Winfree, supra note 69, at 457. However, pardons are not available to
individuals sentenced to life imprisonment and released on parole, and individuals convicted of a violent or sexual offense must undergo a more rigorous application process. Id.
at 459.
269 Id. at 457 (describing application process for setting aside conviction in Canada).
270 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT DIV., CANADIAN NAT’L PAROLE BD., PERFORMANCE
MONITORING REPORT 2007–2008, at 37 (2008), available at http://
www.npb-cnlc.gc.ca/rprts/pmr/pmr_2007_2008/2007-2008-eng.pdf.
271 Individuals convicted of a summary offense who remain crime-free automatically
become eligible for a pardon after three years, while individuals convicted of an indictable
offense who remain crime-free must wait five years and must demonstrate “good conduct”
to be eligible. Id. at 37.
265
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98.5% of all pardon applications were granted.272 While there are several fields of employment in Canada that require background checks,
and criminal records can disqualify individuals from these opportunities, a pardon, once granted, still significantly “reduces the stigma of
conviction and reduces barriers to employment.”273
Like England and Canada, South Africa allows for certain criminal convictions to be expunged, although its expungement law only
applies to minor crimes. Specifically, its Criminal Procedure Act
provides that convictions for an offense punishable by less than six
months of incarceration will “fall away” after ten years have lapsed
since the date of conviction.274 Once a conviction “falls away,” courts
are precluded from relying on them when imposing sentences on subsequent convictions.275
Thus, all three Comparison Countries have mechanisms that, to
various degrees, relieve individuals of the collateral consequences of
their criminal records. These countries recognize that at some point
individuals have moved past their criminal offenses and provide the
legal apparatus necessary to restore these individuals to their preoffense status. While not all convictions in the Comparison Countries
are eligible to be spent, expunged, or pardoned, these countries do, to
a significant extent, provide individuals with the legal tools to put
their criminal pasts behind them.
In contrast, there are no general federal expungement or sealing
provisions in the United States.276 As a result, federal convictions
remain on an individual’s criminal record forever, unless he or she
272 Ruddell & Winfree, supra note 69, at 458. The National Parole Board notes that in
2007–2008, “[t]he grant/issue rate for pardons was 99%.” PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
DIV., supra note 270, at xviii.
273 Ruddell & Winfree, supra note 69, at 459.
274 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s. 271A (S. Afr.), amended by Criminal
Procedure Amendment Act 65 of 2008 s. 2 (S. Afr.). Such convictions will not fall away if
the conviction was for an offense punishable by more than six months of incarceration
without the option of a fine, or if the individual was convicted within the ten-year period of
an offense punishable by more than six months without the option of a fine. Id.; see also
B.C. Naudé, Legislative Expungement of Criminal Records, 15 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 287
(2002) (discussing statute and explaining benefits of expungement).
275 See S. v Muggel 1998 (2) SACR 414 (Cape Provincial Div.) at 419 (S. Afr.).
276 See Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be Paid: A Report Card on the
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 21 CRIM. JUST. 16, 21 (2006). There is one minor
instance in which expungement is available for a federal offense: A person found guilty of
simple drug possession and who has no prior federal or state convictions relating to controlled substances can be placed on probation “for a term of not more than one year
without [a court] entering a judgment of conviction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (2006). The court
may dismiss the charges once the person has successfully completed probation. Id. If the
person was twenty-one years of age or younger when he or she committed the offense, “the
court shall enter an expungement order upon the application of such person.” Id.
§ 3607(c). For an argument in support of federal expungement legislation, see generally
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receives a presidential pardon,277 which is exceedingly rare. At the
state level, gubernatorial pardons are technically available in every
jurisdiction and are the most powerful tools “to avoid or mitigate
conviction-related disabilities and disqualifications affecting employment, housing, and a myriad of other benefits and opportunities.”278
However, like the presidential pardon, state pardons are very rare.279
While most states have expungement or sealing provisions for
state offenses, these mechanisms are generally limited to relatively
narrow circumstances and cannot be applied to federal offenses.
Expungements are usually restricted to certain types of offenses, such
as misdemeanors,280 to individuals with certain types of criminal
records,281 and/or to first offenders.282 Only a few states have
expungement or sealing provisions for adults convicted of felony
offenses.283 Moreover, there are often limits on the number of convictions a person can expunge,284 and there are usually waiting periods
before a person is eligible for expungement.285 Furthermore, a state
pardon or expungement, even if obtained, can be relatively limited
because it “may have no effect upon disabilities imposed under
Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement
Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (2008).
277 Margaret Colgate Love, In Defense of Pardons, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2008, at A27
(noting that presidential pardon “is the only way to overcome the legal and social
consequences of conviction, since a federal conviction cannot be expunged”).
278 LOVE, supra note 198, at 18.
279 Id. at 19 (“In most states only a handful of pardons are granted each year.”).
280 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105(a)(9)(i)–(ix) (LexisNexis Supp.
2009) (listing nuisance crimes eligible for expungement); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71(1)
(West 2006) (limiting expungement to misdemeanors); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 18(8)
(West Supp. 2010) (limiting expungement to misdemeanors); see also LOVE, supra note
198, at xi (summarizing state variations in expungement provisions).
281 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-1207(b)(1) (Supp. 2009) (limiting expungement to
individuals with “no more than one (1) previous felony conviction”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 431.078(4)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (permitting court to seal record of misdemeanor
conviction if at expungement hearing it finds, inter alia, that defendant “had no previous
felony conviction”).
282 E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71(1) (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.32(A)(1) (West Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2(a) (2002).
283 LOVE, supra note 198, at xi.
284 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-8(b) (West 2005) (limiting expungement to one
conviction).
285 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 100A (West 2005) (providing for ten- and
fifteen-year waiting periods for misdemeanors and felonies, respectively); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2C:52-2(a), 52-3, 52-4 (West 2005) (providing for ten-, five-, and two-year waiting
periods for felonies, misdemeanors, and ordinance violations, respectively); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A)(1) (West Supp. 2009) (providing for three- and one-year waiting
periods for felonies and misdemeanors, respectively); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2(b) to (c)
(2002) (providing for five- and ten-year waiting periods for misdemeanors and felonies,
respectively).
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federal law.”286 Some states also have administrative restoration policies.287 However, commentators have noted the inconsistency and limited scope of these provisions, as well as the burdensome logistical
obstacles to obtaining relief.288
Thus, in addition to imposing fewer and less severe collateral consequences up front, the Comparison Countries are also more forgiving
than the United States of individuals with criminal records on the
back end: They more fully allow individuals to recover from their legal
transgressions. Through their relative lack of formal collateral consequences as well as their legal provisions that allow more individuals to
expunge or seal their criminal records or to receive pardons, the
Comparison Countries provide meaningful legal opportunities for
individuals with criminal records to reintegrate into society. In contrast, the United States, through its complex web of post-sentence collateral consequences imposed by federal, state, and local laws,
continues to penalize individuals with criminal records in ways that
adversely affect their ability to move beyond their criminal conviction.
III
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES’ GREATER
RELIANCE ON COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
There are many potential explanations for why the legal
disabilities confronting individuals with criminal records in the United
States are more pervasive and severe than those imposed in the
Comparison Countries. This Part sets forth and examines these explanations. As discussed below, the most convincing explanations for the
United States’ particular reliance on collateral consequences are: (1)
differences in race-based criminal justice policies; and (2) the narrower dignity interests of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals in the United States. However, before getting to these
explanations, this Part will first debunk several plausible but ulti286

LOVE, supra note 198, at 16.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4852.01, 4852.03 (West 2000) (setting out eligibility
for certificate of rehabilitation); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-15(a) (West 2007) (permitting circuit court to “issue a certificate of relief from disabilities to an eligible offender . . .
if the court imposed a sentence other than one executed by commitment to . . . the Department of Corrections”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-37-5(3) (West Supp. 2009) (allowing court to
grant certificate of rehabilitation to person convicted of felony); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 701(1) (McKinney Supp. 2010) (noting that certificate of relief from disabilities may
“relieve an eligible offender of any forfeiture or disability, or . . . remove any bar to his
employment, automatically imposed by law by reason of his conviction”).
288 See, e.g., LOVE, supra note 198, at x (“While every jurisdiction provides at least one
way that convicted persons can avoid or mitigate . . . collateral consequences[,] . . . the
actual mechanisms for relief are generally inaccessible and unreliable, and are frequently
not well understood even by those responsible for administering them.”).
287
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mately unconvincing explanations for these differences. It will then
detail the ways in which issues of race and dignity—particularly the
ways in which they are valued or ignored—account for the expansive
collateral consequences confronting individuals with criminal records
in the United States.
A. Implausible Explanations
Logically, the factors that explain the dramatic incarceration rates
in the United States might also explain why the legal disabilities confronting individuals with criminal records in the United States are
more pervasive and severe than those imposed in countries with
relatively similar issues and criminal justice systems. As noted above,
the expansion of collateral consequences targeting drug offenses in
the 1980s and 1990s paralleled a rapid increase in U.S. incarceration
rates.289 Comparative analyses have offered several explanations for
why the United States incarcerates individuals at dramatically higher
rates than other countries, including that the United States encounters
higher rates of crime (particularly violent crime), more often confronts violent criminal activity, more exhaustively criminalizes certain
behaviors such as drug use, and has a political climate that is simply
different from that of other countries.290
Choosing among these explanations is challenging because of the
myriad social, cultural, political, and legal factors that influence
criminalization and incarceration.291 Nonetheless, these explanations
are important: They foster reflection on, and perhaps reexamination
of, the practices that lead to these disparities.
It is not implausible to think that the factors commonly invoked
to explain growing incarceration rates may at least partly account for
the expansion of collateral consequences in recent decades. Collateral
consequences align criminal justice policies with “law and order”
political views. Arguably, they can help minimize criminal activity and
enhance safety. Nonetheless, as the following sections will demonstrate, there is strong reason to doubt that these explanations fully
explain the greater severity of collateral consequences in the United
States.
1. Collateral Consequences Linked to Underlying Offense
These potential explanations hold most true where the collateral
consequences imposed are directly related to the underlying criminal
289
290
291

See supra notes 4–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C (discussing methodological difficulties in comparative analysis).
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act. In such instances, one can argue that the collateral consequence is
necessary to prevent future harm. An obvious example can be found
in the employment context, when individuals convicted of child sex
offenses are barred from working with children.
However, this rationale cannot explain why individuals with criminal records in the United States confront such a broad array of collateral consequences because most of these consequences are wholly
unrelated to the underlying criminal conduct.292 For example, in some
U.S. jurisdictions, convicted individuals are unable to secure public
housing because of any felony or misdemeanor conviction, are denied
voting privileges because of any felony conviction, or can be denied
an employment license for any felony or misdemeanor offense. In
these jurisdictions, the underlying goals and political realities noted
above do not correlate with the blanket imposition of these
consequences.
2. General Deterrence
One might also argue that collateral consequences unrelated to
the underlying criminal act are still legitimate because they serve
deterrence purposes and thus enhance public safety. The idea here is
that deterrence could be a plausible goal even when the nexus
between the criminal act and the collateral penalty is tenuous or nonexistent. In this context, denying public housing to an individual convicted of any misdemeanor (or, in some jurisdictions, even a
noncriminal violation)293 may not be the result of any assumption that
the particular individual would pose a danger to his or her neighbors.
Rather, the penalty serves to deter individuals living in public housing
and prospective public housing tenants from engaging in criminal
activity.
However, there are reasons to doubt that deterrence explains the
proliferation of collateral consequences in recent decades. A basic
precept of general deterrence theory is that individuals, to be deterred
by a penalty, must be aware of its existence.294 For deterrence to
work, the fear of the resulting penalty must outweigh the benefits that
292 See Demleitner, supra note 39, at 1027–28 (“While ‘collateral restrictions’ that are
closely tied to the risk an individual offender poses may be defensible, many of those
currently imposed are not justifiable on punishment grounds.”).
293 E.g., Smyth, supra note 9, at 482 (noting that noncriminal violation “makes a person
presumptively ineligible for New York City public housing for two years”).
294 Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 181 (2008)
(“[T]he effectiveness of deterrence is premised on the actor’s knowledge of the sanctions
themselves and an ability to weigh not only the severity of the sanction with which he or
she will be met, but also the likelihood of being met with that sanction.”).
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would flow from the criminal act.295 However, collateral consequences
are often invisible to potential offenders.296 Actors in the criminal
justice system—defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and even
judges—are also largely unaware of the scope of collateral consequences297 because these consequences are not considered part of the
“criminal” punishment; are deemed to be separate from the criminal
justice system;298 and derive from a complex and scattered mix of
statutes, regulations, and policies. Thus, unlike “direct” sentencing
consequences, such as jail/prison sentences, probation, and fines,299
collateral consequences are largely unknown to the audience that a
deterrence-based policy would seek to reach.
3. Retribution
Another potential explanation for the expansion of collateral
consequences is that the political and moral landscapes in the United
States, as expressed through its laws and public discourse, require that
convicted individuals be punished further at the conclusion of their
sentences. Under this retributive theory, collateral consequences are
imposed as extensions of the “criminal” punishment—in essence, they
supplement the direct punishment. This theory holds particular weight
in instances where collateral consequences are imposed automatically
upon conviction for particular criminal offenses regardless of individual circumstances and in instances where the collateral consequences are not directly connected to the underlying criminal conduct
(or where the connection between consequence and conduct has not
been articulated legislatively).
However, this explanation is legally flawed because courts have
routinely held that collateral consequences do not constitute criminal
295

Id.
Jeremy Travis is credited with coining the phrase “invisible punishment” to describe
collateral consequences. See Travis, supra note 174, at 16.
297 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, § 19-2.1 cmt. (describing difficulty
of ascertaining all collateral consequences that apply to particular conviction); Chin, supra
note 39, at 253–54 (noting that it would be extremely difficult for judges or attorneys to
gather information about all collateral consequences relevant to particular charge).
298 See Nora V. Demleitner, A Vicious Cycle: Resanctioning Offenders, in CIVIL
PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 73, at 185, 186 (“[C]ourts have generally
declined to find . . . collateral sanctions punishment for constitutional purposes . . . .”);
Pinard, supra note 41, at 642–44 nn.110–11, 113–19, 121 & 123 (citing state court decisions
rejecting appellate claims that defendants should have been informed of various collateral
consequences prior to guilty pleas).
299 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H)–(I) (stating that before accepting guilty plea, court
must inform defendant of direct sentencing consequences, such as “any maximum possible
penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and a term of supervised release,” and “any
mandatory minimum penalty”).
296
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punishment.300 Instead, courts have held these consequences to be
civil disabilities, or indirect consequences of criminal convictions.301
As such, while these consequences might “punish” individuals in the
colloquial sense, they fall outside the legal scope of criminal
punishment.302
Another retributive explanation for the expansion of collateral
consequences is that, while they are not part of the criminal punishment itself, they represent an extension of the penal harshness that is
imposed in the United States. James Whitman has persuasively
written about the greater harshness of U.S. policies, arguing that the
U.S. criminal justice system more thoroughly degrades prisoners than
those in European countries.303 He observes, for instance, that the
United States relies much more on prisons,304 sentences individuals to
longer periods of incarceration,305 and accords less “respect” to its
prisoners than do European countries.306 He opines that punishment
in the United States is collective and de-individualized, in contrast to
the individualized punishment imposed in European countries.307
Although Whitman does not discuss collateral consequences, his
views could be extended to the collateral consequences imposed in the
300 In doing so, the courts have rejected claims that such consequences violate constitutional protections against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. E.g., Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that Alaska’s sexual offender registration requirement was
not criminal punishment and therefore applying it retroactively did not violate Ex Post
Facto Clause); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (holding that Kansas’s civil
commitment law did not violate double jeopardy or ex post facto protections because it did
not constitute criminal punishment); Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 428–31 (7th Cir.
2000) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to federal law banning individuals convicted of
certain drug-related felonies from receiving welfare benefits). Courts have also rejected
claims that defendants must be informed of these consequences by defense attorneys or
judges prior to entering guilty pleas. See Pinard, supra note 41, at 642–44 (citing cases
rejecting claims that defendants should have been informed about consequences involving,
inter alia, civil commitment, sex offender registration, employment, and voting).
301 These courts have held that these disabilities are “civil” because they are imposed by
agencies independent from the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duffey,
639 A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. 1994) (holding that trial court was not required to inform defendant that his driver’s license would be suspended as result of guilty plea because suspension was “collateral civil consequence”); see also Travis, supra note 174, at 16 (observing
that courts and legislatures have defined collateral consequences “as ‘civil’ rather than
criminal in nature, as ‘disabilities’ rather than punishments, [and] as the ‘collateral
consequences’ of criminal convictions rather than the direct results”).
302 See, e.g., People v. Boespflug, 107 P.3d 1118, 1121 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that
trial court was not required to inform defendant he would lose right to vote while incarcerated, because disenfranchisement does not constitute criminal punishment).
303 See generally WHITMAN, supra note 91.
304 Id. at 8.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 43.
307 Id. at 73.
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United States to the extent that these sanctions degrade, aggregate,
and stigmatize the formerly incarcerated, and thus exacerbate the
ways in which individuals with criminal records are negatively perceived and treated as outcasts.308 Under this view, the more encompassing collateral consequences that attach to convictions in the
United States are consistent with the greater overall harshness of the
U.S. criminal justice system.
While this theory, at first blush, seems persuasive, it fails to recognize an interesting fact: While Canada and England have adopted
crime control policies and punishment schemes that are similar to
those of the United States, they have stopped short of adopting the
vast network of collateral consequences that besets individuals in the
United States.309 Rather, as discussed in Part II, these countries have
not imposed collateral consequences nearly as harsh or as permanent
as those imposed in the United States. This suggests that factors aside
from the harshness of U.S. sentencing and crime control policies are
responsible for the unique harshness of collateral consequences in the
United States.
B. Plausible Explanations
1. Race-Based Criminal Justice Policies
a. United States
Collateral consequences have always attached to criminal records
in the United States. Scholars have explained that these consequences
descend from England’s notion of “civil death,” which historically
accompanied convictions.310 These consequences became less severe
over time, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, but they expanded
dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the “war on drugs” and
“tough on crime” movements.311 The incarceration rate in the United
States soared as a result of policies adopted during these move308 Similarly, the governments of England, Canada, and South Africa provide broader
welfare support to their citizens than the United States, including in their policies relating
to the formerly incarcerated. Thus, a related explanation is that these countries do not have
the web of collateral consequences imposed in the United States because they have social
support structures that are generally more sustaining. See SIMON, supra note 2, at 26 (“The
complex strategic problems formed by the separation of executive and legislative branches,
and by the separation of state and federal governments, have made the fashioning of a fullfledged welfare state . . . virtually impossible in the United States.”).
309 See supra Part II (comparing collateral consequences imposed in the United States,
England, Canada, and South Africa).
310 See supra notes 93–95 and sources cited therein (describing origins of U.S. collateral
consequences in English law).
311 See infra notes 327–31 and accompanying text.
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ments.312 Scholars have argued that these policies not only disproportionately impact people of color,313 but were designed, at least in part,
specifically to do so,314 as their disproportionate impact was quite
foreseeable.315
Scholars have similarly argued that the growth of collateral
consequences, like the incarceration explosion, has been rooted in
race.316 The role of race is particularly evident when it comes to felon
disenfranchisement, where contemporary policies follow a long historical pattern of racial exclusion. Criminal disenfranchisement laws
reach back to colonial times in the United States and were extended
in original state constitutions.317 Even with the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870,318 African American disenfranchisement
continued in the South. After Reconstruction, disenfranchisement
laws were retooled specifically to exclude African Americans from
voting.319 Several “southern states tailored their disenfranchisement
312 See BUTLER, supra note 2, at 46 (“The War on Drugs is the single most important
explanation for mass incarceration.”). In 1973, the United States incarcerated 200,000
individuals. 1997 BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIM. JUST. STATS. 490
tbl.6.35 (1998) (noting that 204,211 individuals were incarcerated in federal and state
prisons at end of 1973). At midyear 2008, the United States incarcerated over 2.3 million
individuals in its prisons and jails. WEST & SABOL, supra note 119, at 16 tbl.15. The shift
away from the rehabilitation model in the 1970s also impacted the reentry-related services
available in U.S. prisons. See Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration:
Implications for Postprison Adjustment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, supra note 38, at
33, 36 (“Abandoning the once-avowed goal of rehabilitation certainly decreased the perceived need for and availability of meaningful programming for prisoners, as well as social
and mental health services provided to them both inside and outside the prison.”).
313 See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 145 (1999) (arguing that increased law
enforcement budgets and enhanced political and media attention related to “war on drugs”
led to more resources directed at drug offenders in 1990s, with “police increasingly . . .
target[ing] low-income minority communities for drug law enforcement”).
314 Id.; see also infra notes 332–48 and accompanying text.
315 TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 54–55 (2007) (arguing that various factors,
such as drug markets being “concentrated in poor, urban areas,” drug distribution at street
level being dominated “by poor African-American (and to a lesser extent in some regions,
Hispanic) males,” and “[e]nforcement practices that concentrate undercover work on
apprehending street dealers in impoverished neighborhoods,” were “well known at the
time the War on Drugs got underway, and . . . could have convinced us that the negative
consequences of the war would fall disproportionately on poor minority males”).
316 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 139–60 (2010) (analogizing collateral consequences to Jim
Crow–era policies that targeted and excluded African Americans).
317 Ewald, supra note 95, at 1062–63.
318 U.S. CONST. amend. XV (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
319 See Ewald, supra note 95, at 1090–95 (describing disenfranchisement laws rewritten
in several southern states post-Reconstruction to single out African Americans); Andrew
L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A
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laws” to crimes purportedly committed primarily by African
Americans, “while excluding crimes purportedly committed primarily
by whites.”320 Others imposed poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses.321 Along with these measures, “the explicit use of felon
disenfranchisement contributed to preventing African Americans . . .
from voting.”322 Thus, felon disenfranchisement in the United States is
tied to broader efforts to prevent African Americans from voting.
As scholars Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen explain, disenfranchisement laws remained relatively stable between the 1920s and
1950s.323 From the late 1950s to the 1970s, many states eased their
felon disenfranchisement laws, providing greater access to voting
booths for individuals with criminal records.324 Although this trend
continues today,325 categories of individuals with criminal records are
excluded from voting in most states, and these prohibitions continue
to fall hardest on African Americans. For example, “13 percent of
African-American men have lost the right to vote, a rate that is seven
times the national average.”326
The other collateral consequences discussed in this Article do not
share similar records of explicit racial targeting. However, these consequences expanded dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the
“war on drugs.” To help fight this “war,” Congress created several
collateral consequences that disqualify drug offenders from various
federal aid programs.327 For example, Congress passed laws that
disqualify those convicted of felony drug offenses from receiving speNew Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 540 (1993) (noting that although disenfranchisement laws
in South preceded Fifteenth Amendment, “between 1890 and 1910, many Southern states
tailored their criminal disenfranchisement laws . . . to increase the effect of these laws on
black citizens”). For a detailed history of the intersection of felon disenfranchisement laws
and race, see MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 35, at 41–68.
320 Marc Mauer, Felon Disenfranchisement: A Policy Whose Time Has Passed?, 31 HUM.
RTS. 16, 16 (2004).
321 THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 126 (noting these restrictions and explaining that their
“express purpose . . . was to disenfranchise as many Blacks as possible without violating the
. . . Fifteenth Amendment”).
322 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 35, at 57.
323 Id. at 58.
324 Id. at 59.
325 See, e.g., Gregg [NMI] Sangillo, Ex-felons Push for Voting Rights, NAT’L J., Jan. 20,
2007, at 63 (reporting that “16 states have implemented policy reforms to loosen felon
disenfranchisement law since 1997”).
326 ERIKA WOOD, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTORING THE RIGHT TO VOTE 7
(2009), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/5c8532e8134b233182_z5m6ibv1n.pdf (citation
omitted).
327 See Chin, supra note 39, at 259–60 (observing that “drug offenses are subjected to
more and harsher collateral consequences than any other category of crime” and listing
various federal aid programs affected).
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cific public benefits, including food stamps;328 that make individuals
convicted of distribution or possession of controlled substances ineligible for a variety of federal benefits;329 that disqualify individuals
convicted of specific drug offenses from federal health care programs;330 and that disqualify, for certain periods of time, students convicted of any drug offense (including misdemeanors) from receiving
federal student loans.331
Unlike felon disenfranchisement laws, these consequences did
not explicitly target African Americans. However, at the very least,
the decisionmakers who enacted these consequences ignored both the
racial history of drug criminalization and the predictably disproportionate impact that these consequences would have on people of
color. Legal scholars such as Paul Butler, Gabriel Chin, and David
Sklansky have explained that drug criminalization began largely in
response to perceived associations between particular drugs and
particular minority groups. Butler has explained that drug criminalization began in the late 1800s, out of fear in San Francisco “that Chinese
men were using opium to seduce white women.”332 Chin has described
how purported links between cocaine and African Americans in the
early 1900s helped provoke the criminalization of cocaine.333 Sklansky
has explained that opium, powder cocaine, marijuana, and heroin
were strongly associated, respectively, with Chinese immigrants in the
late nineteenth century, African Americans in the South in the early
twentieth century, Mexican Americans in the 1920s and 1930s, and
African Americans in the 1950s.334
Similar concerns with minority drug use in the 1980s and 1990s
help to explain the dramatic expansion of collateral consequences
during these decades. In both decades, media accounts portrayed
various “pathologies” linked to poor African American communities,
328

See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
21 U.S.C. § 862 (2006). These benefits are defined as “the issuance of any grant,
contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the
United States or by appropriated funds of the United States.” Id. § 862(d)(1)(A).
330 Individuals convicted after August 21, 1996, of a felony offense “relating to the
unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance”
are ineligible to participate in any federal healthcare program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(4)
(2006). In addition, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has the discretion to
exclude from these health care programs individuals convicted under federal or state law
of a misdemeanor relating to these offenses. Id. § 1320a-7(b)(3).
331 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006). To fall under this statute, the student had to be
receiving a federal “grant, loan, or work assistance” at the time of the offense. Id.
332 BUTLER, supra note 2, at 44.
333 Chin, supra note 39, at 257–58.
334 David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1292–94 (1995).
329
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including the convergence of illicit drug consumption and public benefits. These media accounts presented the stereotypical welfare recipient as an African American female.335 Media coverage of the
proliferation of crack cocaine in communities across the country
during the late 1980s further linked race with drugs and crime.336
Against this backdrop of race, drugs, crime, and welfare,
Congress waged a “war on drugs,” which resulted in harsh sentencing
schemes that have fallen overwhelmingly on African Americans and
Latinos.337 African Americans and Latinos make up the majority of
those arrested for and convicted of drug offenses despite studies
showing that Whites constitute the majority of drug users.338 This perverse result is the byproduct of the influence of race at key decision
points in the criminal process, such as the arrest and charging stages,
and scholars have found that biases, both conscious and unconscious,
can influence policing practices, prosecutorial discretion, and sentencing.339 Studies have detailed the extent to which sentencing
laws—such as the federal sentencing policy which imposes more
severe punishment for possession of crack than for powder
335 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 38 (describing terms like “welfare queens” as
part of “new ‘coded’ terminology . . . employed to recast public welfare as an issue of
race”).
336 See id. at 13–14 (describing media coverage of crack cocaine in 1980s and 1990s as
well as studies concluding that media stories on drug war coverage linked drugs with race);
Sklansky, supra note 334, at 1293–94 (noting that sponsors of first federal legislative bills
that proposed enhanced penalties for crack cocaine offenses cited some of these media
stories with approval).
337 See, e.g., Fagan & Meares, supra note 294, at 175, 178 (observing that incarceration
in United States “increased massively” beginning in 1980s, with “high rates of AfricanAmerican involvement with the criminal justice system clearly [being] tied to drug
offending”); Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 257 (2009) (“What is not debatable . . . is that th[e] ostensibly
race-neutral effort [of the war on drugs] has been waged primarily against black
Americans.”); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-racial Racism: Policing Race in the Age of Obama,
98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2010) (manuscript at 115, on file with author), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418212 (“Since the late 1960s,
Republicans and Democrats have competed by punishing criminals and welfare queens.
Posturing through ever-more punitive crime policies and ever-more restrictive social programs, federal and state party politics drove mass imprisonment and simultaneously dismantled the social net.”).
338 See Chin, supra note 39, at 265–66 (noting that although Whites “represent the vast
majority of drug offenders,” they are “less likely to be arrested; if arrested, less likely to be
convicted; and if convicted, less likely to be imprisoned than members of other races”); see
also TONRY, supra note 21, at 108–10 (discussing studies showing disparate arrest rates).
339 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of
the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 202–03 (2007) (“Prosecutors, along
with other criminal justice officials, must be willing to acknowledge the role they play in
contributing to [unwarranted racial] disparities.”).
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cocaine340—and school zone drug laws341 have had a disproportionate
impact on African Americans. Studies also illustrate that young
African Americans are disproportionately prosecuted as adults342 and
that African Americans disproportionately receive life sentences.343
At the same time that they were increasing penalties for drug
offenses,344 legislators were also hastily expanding collateral consequences.345 Some scholars trace the expansion of these consequences
to public and media pressure on politicians in the 1980s, who “[i]n fear
of being perceived as soft on crime, . . . moved to increase penalties,
incarceration, and collateral sanctions with little or no research as to
the long-term consequences of these policies.”346 Much like the
dramatically higher incarceration rates that followed the “war on
drugs” in the 1980s and 1990s, the dramatic expansion of collateral
consequences has disproportionately impacted people of color.347
340 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 2–3, 15–16 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_Congress/
Cocaine2007.pdf (reporting extent to which African Americans have been disproportionately convicted and sentenced for crack-cocaine offenses, which trigger substantially longer
sentences than powder-cocaine offenses).
341 See JUDITH GREENE ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., DISPARITY BY DESIGN: HOW
DRUG-FREE ZONE LAWS IMPACT RACIAL DISPARITY–AND FAIL TO PROTECT YOUTH 4,
16–18, 26–28 (2006), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/
06-03_REP_DisparitybyDesign_DP-JJ-RD.pdf (concluding that drug-free zone laws,
which enhance penalties for drug-related crimes committed within specific distances from
certain locations such as schools, parks, and public housing have fallen disproportionately
on African Americans).
342 See Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You’re Out? Constitutional
Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 65, 85 n.87 (2003)
(citing studies finding that African American youth are disproportionately adjudicated as
adults).
343 See ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE
EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 13, 20–21 (2009), available at http://
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_noexit.pdf (finding that African
Americans comprise nearly half of both juveniles and adults sentenced to life
imprisonment).
344 See Thompson, supra note 6, at 262–64 (describing legislative decisions to increase
sentences).
345 Legislators implemented many of the collateral consequences for drug-related convictions at this time. For example, legislators imposed restrictions on federal welfare benefits, student loans, and public housing. See 20 U.S.C. 1091(r) (denying federal student loans
to individuals convicted of drug-related offenses); 21 U.S.C. 862a (1996) (denying federal
welfare benefits to individuals convicted of drug-related offenses); 24 C.F.R.
§ 966.4(l)(5)(i)(A) (2008) (denying public housing assistance to individuals convicted of
manufacturing or producing methamphetamine on premises of federal housing).
346 THOMPSON, supra note 67, at 16.
347 See, e.g., id. at 10 (observing that collateral consequences “have had at once a disparate and a devastating impact on communities of color”); Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six,
Mass Incarceration, and the Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
477, 482 (2009) (“Because the War on Drugs has resulted in felony convictions for many
African American men, the special collateral consequences of drug convictions profoundly
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While it is impossible to determine the extent to which, if at all, racial
animus motivated this legislation, given the imprint that the criminal
justice system has stamped on racial minorities throughout U.S. history, it was foreseeable that the expansion of collateral consequences
would impact African Americans and Latinos disproportionately.
Thus, the dramatic growth of collateral consequences, particularly
those that attach to drug offenses, can be understood as extensions of
criminal justice policies that unfairly target people of color.348
b. Comparison Countries: Canada and South Africa
The relationship between race and collateral consequences
becomes even more evident when patterns in the United States are
compared with those in Canada and South Africa.349 Like the United
States, these countries have histories of employing criminal justice
policies that disproportionately affect racial minorities and indigenous
peoples.350
Unlike the United States, however, Canada has recognized both
the historic and contemporary discrimination in its criminal justice
system and has actively taken steps to lessen disparities in incarceration. In 1996, in response to both its overall escalated incarceration
rate and its disproportionate incarceration of Aborigines, Canada
codified in its Criminal Code a statute providing for conditional sentence of imprisonment351 with “the express goal of reducing the use of
incarceration as a sanction.”352 Under this statute, “an offender
should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be
appropriate in the circumstances.”353 While the statute requires judges
to consider “all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are
reasonable in the circumstances . . . for all offenders,” it requires
impact African American community life.”); Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert:
Restoring Ideas of Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 111, 138 (2007) (observing that collateral consequences “have the biggest impact on
minorities”).
348 See Chin, supra note 39, at 258–59 (“The history of drug policy and of collateral
consequences reflects an unfortunate tendency to criminalize conduct thought to have
been engaged in by minority groups, and to impose special punishments on those convicted
of such crimes and not others.”).
349 Unlike courts in Canada and South Africa, English courts appear to have not yet
articulated a connection between race and particular collateral consequences, as searches
for relevant cases turned up no results.
350 See supra Part I.D.2–3.
351 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 718.2(d) (2009), http://laws.justice.gc.ca/
PDF/Statute/C/C-46.pdf. For an empirical evaluation of the impact of conditional
sentences on imprisonment rates in Canada, see Roberts & Gabor, supra note 139, at 94,
99–104.
352 See Roberts & Gabor, supra note 139, at 94.
353 R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 718.2(d).
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judges to pay “particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal
offenders.”354
In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Regina v. Gladue, asserted that “judges should pay particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders because those circumstances are unique, and different from those of non-aboriginal
offenders.”355 The Court emphasized that this statute is “remedial”
because it directs “sentencing judges to undertake the process of sentencing aboriginal offenders differently, in order to endeavor to
achieve a truly fit and proper sentence in the particular case.”356
Similarly, in Sauvé v. Canada, the Court struck down a law that disenfranchised prisoners sentenced to more than two years of incarceration, emphasizing that because of “the disproportionate number of
Aboriginal people in penitentiaries,” the restriction would have “a
disproportionate impact on Canada’s already disadvantaged
Aboriginal population.”357
Similarly, South African courts, in post-apartheid cases, have in
several contexts explicitly considered South Africa’s history of racial
subjugation. Judges and courts have declared this history to be not
only relevant but central to determining particular legal claims and
interpreting the Constitution. For instance, in his concurring opinion
in Brink v Kitshoff NO, Justice O’Regan of the Constitutional Court
stated that the Equality Clause of South Africa’s Constitution “needs
to be interpreted” in light of apartheid’s “system[atic] discriminat[ion]
against black people in all aspects of social life” and “the enduring
legacy that it bequeathed.”358 Likewise, in Minister of Home Affairs v
National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of
Offenders (NICRO), the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional a law that disenfranchised those individuals sentenced to prison
without the option of paying a fine in lieu of imprisonment.359 In the
context of discussing the centrality of the right to vote to democratic
values, the Court observed that “[i]n the light of our history, where
denial of the right to vote was used to entrench white supremacy and
to marginalise the great majority of the people of our country, it is for
354

Id. § 718.2(e).
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 708 (Can.) (emphasis in original).
356 Id. at 706.
357 [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, 523 (Can.); see also supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text
(discussing Sauvé’s holding that felon disenfranchisement is inconsistent with Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
358 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) at 217 (S. Afr.) (O’Regan, J., concurring).
359 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) (S. Afr.).
355

May 2010]

COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

519

us a precious right which must be vigilantly respected and
protected.”360
2. The Narrower Dignity Interests of Incarcerated and Formerly
Incarcerated Individuals in the United States
While its boundaries are vague,361 “human dignity has come to be
accepted as a core value of [human rights] jurisprudence.”362 The
human rights model of dignity seeks to provide robust protections for
the dignity of individuals who are incarcerated. The United States has
adhered to a much narrower vision of the dignity interests of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated individuals than have the Comparison
Countries, particularly Canada and South Africa.
Perhaps the most vivid example of these narrower interests is
found in the voting rights context. As detailed above, sentenced prisoners in Canada363 and South Africa364 retain their right to vote
during incarceration, and the European Court of Human Rights
recently struck down the United Kingdom’s blanket disenfranchisement of individuals convicted of a crime.365 In striking down laws that
disenfranchised prisoners, both Canadian and South African courts
invoked the human rights concept of dignity. For example, the
Canadian Supreme Court held that disenfranchisement compromised
360

Id. at 297.
See Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, in THE CONCEPT
OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 133, 134 (David Kretzmer & Eckart
Klein eds., 2002) (recognizing “breadth” of concept of dignity and noting “difficulty . . .
defining its limits”); Rory O’Connell, The Role of Dignity in Equality Law: Lessons from
Canada and South Africa, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 267, 268 (2008) (noting that dignity is “an
ambiguous concept, one which conceals very different ideas of what constitutes a life with
dignity”). The concept of dignity is similarly vague in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
See Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right, 27 HOW. L.J. 145, 149–50
(1984) (noting that concept of dignity is “extremely broad” and “open-ended”).
362 Chaskalson, supra note 361, at 137; see also Paulo G. Carozza, Human Dignity and
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L., 931, 932 (2008)
(“[T]he idea of human dignity serves as the single most widely recognized and invoked
basis for grounding the idea of human rights generally . . . .”); Alan Gewirth, Human
Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND
AMERICAN VALUES 10, 10 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (“The relations between human dignity and human rights are many and complex, but one relation is
primary: human rights are based upon or derivative from human dignity.”).
363 See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text (discussing Sauvé v. Canada (Chief
Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.), which overturned law denying right to vote
to individuals sentenced to more than two years imprisonment).
364 See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text (discussing Minister of Home Affairs
v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO),
2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) (S. Afr.), which held that people who have been incarcerated cannot
be denied right to vote).
365 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187.
361
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the dignity interests enjoyed by all incarcerated individuals.366 Specifically, it declared that individuals are not wholly disconnected from
larger society when incarcerated, and that their voices in societal
affairs, while perhaps muted, must not be silenced altogether.367
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Hirst v.
United Kingdom (No. 2) was premised on notions of human dignity,368
and much of South Africa’s post-apartheid constitutional jurisprudence is tied to broader human rights notions of dignity.369
In contrast to Canadian, South African, and English prisoners,
individuals incarcerated in state and federal prisons in the United
States—with the exception of those incarcerated in Maine and
Vermont—cannot vote in any election.370 While felon disenfranchisement has received the most scholarly and media coverage of any collateral consequence in the United States, the debates have centered
primarily on whether to restore voting rights to individuals after they
have been released from incarceration or have otherwise completed
their sentences.371 The United States virtually stands alone as “the
only country in the democratic world that systematically disenfranchises large numbers of nonincarcerated offenders.”372
In contrast to Canada and South Africa, the United States’
“jurisprudence touching on human rights is impoverished.”373 Indeed,
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, at least in the contexts of criminal
366 Sauvé v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. at 522; see also supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
367 Sauvé v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. at 522; see also supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
368 See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 208–18 (striking down U.K. blanket felony disenfranchisement law as inconsistent with dignity-based rights guaranteed to prisoners under
European Convention on Human Rights).
369 See supra notes 253–57 and accompanying text.
370 See FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS, supra note 205, at 1.
371 See Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner
Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71, 75 (2003) (noting that
opponents of disenfranchisement have focused reform efforts on those who have been
released from incarceration and “have left largely unchallenged the law and policy that
justifies disenfranchising the two million individuals currently incarcerated in the United
States” (citation omitted)). In contrast, “debates within European nations over disenfranchisement . . . [are] over which prisoners should be barred from voting. In almost all
cases, the debate stops at the prison walls.” LALAH ISPAHANI, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 4 (2006), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file825_25663.pdf).
372 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 35, at 38.
373 Peggy Cooper Davis, Toward a Relational Constitutionalism, in DIGNITY, FREEDOM
AND THE POST-APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER: THE CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAURIE
ACKERMANN 239, 243 (Aj Barnard-Naudé et al. eds., 2008).
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sentencing and confinement conditions,374 articulates a narrow vision
of dignity that is rooted in the Eighth Amendment’s protection
against cruel and unusual punishment.375 This vision sets outer boundaries on the types and levels of punishment that can be inflicted
without offending constitutional protections.
As a result, the United States asks whether a certain measure,
practice, or deprivation violates the personal dignity interests
protected by the Constitution, rather than asking whether the overall
legislative scheme is consistent with a robust belief in human dignity
generally. In essence, in the United States the concept of dignity is an
end point that cannot be passed; it is invoked only in response to the
most egregious laws or government conduct. In the Comparison
Countries, by contrast, the courts use dignity as the starting point for
interpretation, from which rights flow. Consequently, the Comparison
Countries offer much more robust protection of dignity interests than
the United States.
Moreover, Eighth Amendment protections extend primarily to
the contexts of sentencing and prison conditions, both of which are
considered criminal punishment. But because collateral consequences
are not considered criminal punishment,376 the protections of the
Eighth Amendment do not apply to them.377 This serves to further
374 The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated dignity interests in wide-ranging contexts.
See generally Paust, supra note 361, at 149–84 (tracing Court’s use of concept of human
dignity since 1940s).
375 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.”); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”).
Scholars have argued both that the Supreme Court has narrowed Eighth Amendment protections and that the Court’s jurisprudence in this area has been inconsistent. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1062 (2004)
(observing that Court has “emphasized proportionality” in death penalty cases, forfeiture
cases, and punitive damages cases involving due process issues, but has “refused to find
prison sentences disproportionate”); Nilsen, supra note 347, at 140–42 (noting that Court
has narrowed Eighth Amendment protections since 1980s).
Dignity protections also exist outside of the sentencing and confinement areas in the
criminal justice context. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (holding
that forced extraction of capsules from Rochin’s stomach was “offensive to human dignity”
and violated Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
376 See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text.
377 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363–69 (1997) (upholding Kansas civil commitment law against constitutional challenge because commitment is not form of “punishment”); Nilsen, supra note 347, at 144 (“[U]nder the Court’s current view, no
constitutional weight is given to the multifold assaults on dignity that arise when exprisoners are continuously prevented from becoming fully participating members of their
families and communities.”).

522

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:457

narrow the United States’ conception of human dignity vis-à-vis the
Comparison Countries.
The various collateral consequences imposed upon individuals in
the United States seriously infringe upon the dignity interests of those
with criminal records. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized as much
in Lawrence v. Texas.378 In Lawrence, the Court overturned a Texas
statute that banned same-sex sodomy. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy tied collateral consequences to dignity, noting that although
sodomy was considered to be a minor offense in Texas because it was
a low-level misdemeanor, it “[s]till . . . remains a criminal offense with
all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged.”379 In this context, Kennedy was referring to the potential sex offender registration
requirements that would attach to such a conviction, as well as “the
other collateral consequences always following a conviction, such as
notations on job application forms, to mention but one example.”380
Thus, the Court recognized that collateral consequences extend
the dignity-stripping punishments that accompany incarceration and,
as a result, continue to degrade individuals after they have finished
their sentences. By continuing to exclude these individuals from mainstream society, these consequences make it nearly impossible for them
to provide for themselves and, in many ways, isolate them from their
families and communities.
The differing views in the United States and the Comparison
Countries about how collateral consequences impact dignity may
result from a deeper philosophical disagreement over how society
should conceive of and apportion the amenities and opportunities that
collateral consequences temporarily or permanently eliminate. As
Patricia Allard has convincingly argued, collateral consequences
expose a dichotomy in the United States between rights and privileges.381 Allard observes that collateral consequences in the United
States simply eliminate privileges, which can be stripped away from
individuals with relative ease, as opposed to rights, which enjoy
enhanced protections.
This dichotomy helps to explain the distinctions between the
United States and the Comparison Countries with regard to collateral
consequences. For example, voting in Canada and South Africa is a
378

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 575.
380 Id. at 576.
381 Patricia Allard, Claiming Our Rights: Challenging Postconviction Penalties Using an
International Human Rights Framework, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES,
supra note 73, at 223, 228–29.
379
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true right specifically guaranteed to all adult citizens,382 and these
countries’ courts have rejected attempts to strip this right from
prisoners.
In contrast, while the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the
right to vote “is regarded as a fundamental political right, . . . preservative of all rights,”383 the ability to exercise this right has often been
limited by conditions and exceptions. Historically, African Americans
were excluded from the franchise in many parts of the country,
despite the Fifteenth Amendment.384 After the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965385 and key decisions by the Warren Court,386 the
right to vote became more firmly established in the United States.
Nonetheless, obstacles to exercising the right to vote are not confined
to history. For example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board,387 the Court upheld Indiana’s requirement that in-person
voters have photographic identification at primary and general elections, even though the requirement imposes burdens on some otherwise qualified voters.388
Felon disenfranchisement—which is the rule in forty-eight
states—is the paradigmatic example of the fragility of the right to vote
in the United States. Thus, unlike voting rights in Canada and South
Africa, the right to vote in the United States is so diminished by the
Constitution’s broad felony exception that it seems more akin to a
privilege, rather than a true right. Moreover, this illustrates the limited
dignity interests that the United States affords to individuals with
criminal records.

382 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch.
11, § 3 (U.K.) (“Every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of
the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly . . . .”); S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, § 19
(“Every adult citizen has the right to vote in elections for any legislative body established
in terms of the Constitution . . . .”).
383 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
384 See supra notes 317–24 and accompanying text.
385 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa-6
(2006)).
386 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax
as violation of Equal Protection Clause); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding
that state legislative districts must be equally apportioned).
387 128A S. Ct. 1610, 1613–15 (2008).
388 See id. at 1628–35 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing serious burdens imposed by
identification requirements—including travel costs and fees for obtaining license—and
inadequacy of provisional ballot exception as remedy).
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IV
PROPOSALS
As one scholar observes, “reintegration rests on the fulfillment of
a necessary condition: the punishment must end at some point to
allow for the possibility of reintegration.”389 However, the United
States has a uniquely extensive and debilitating web of collateral consequences that continue to punish and stigmatize individuals with
criminal records long after the completion of their sentences. These
consequences stifle reintegration by making it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to move past their criminal records and for
families to reunite and thrive.390
The United States should draw lessons from the Comparison
Countries analyzed in this Article and reshape its web of collateral
consequences. The overall goal of collateral consequences in any
country should be to best position formerly incarcerated individuals to
become productive contributors to their families and communities. To
move closer to this goal, the United States should: (1) implement
measures that enhance the dignity interests of individuals with criminal records; (2) tailor any collateral consequences to the underlying
offense; (3) implement mechanisms to alleviate the legal penalties that
accompany a criminal record; and (4) analyze the racially disproportionate impact of collateral consequences. As explained below, these
recommendations are interrelated.
A. Implement Measures That Enhance the Dignity of
Individuals with Criminal Records
The United States should follow the lead of the Comparison
Countries and recast its post-sentence penalties to enhance the dignity
of individuals with criminal records so as to provide them with the
tools to live productive post-incarceration lives. The first step is to
remove unnecessary legal impediments to reentry. As much as is
possible, a dignity-based approach would seek to respect these individuals as potential contributors to their families and communities.
For example, the Comparison Countries have legal mechanisms that
more readily allow individuals with criminal records to participate in
the political process.391 By contrast, the United States still disenfranchises millions of individuals with criminal records, imposes broad
389

Jean-Paul Brodeur, Comparative Penology in Perspective, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT,
POLITICS, supra note 59, at 49, 59.
390 The impact of collateral consequences on families has been exacerbated by the
increasing numbers of women prisoners being released from incarceration. See supra notes
118–19 and accompanying text.
391 See supra Part II.A.
AND
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employment-related legal restrictions, and prohibits many individuals
with criminal records from accessing public housing and other benefits.392 These consequences—by restricting the ability of individuals
with criminal records to obtain employment and housing, by silencing
their civic voices, and by isolating them from their families and communities—compromise core dignity interests.393
Decisionmakers in the United States should look to international
human rights instruments to gain broader insights on punishment
practices that would best preserve the dignity of individuals with criminal records.394 Several treaties and conventions, as well as the courts
and commissions that interpret these documents, set out limitations
on punishment.395 A burgeoning scholarly literature argues that
particular collateral consequences in the United States, most notably
felon disenfranchisement, violate various human rights protocols.396
An example of a human rights approach to collateral consequences can be found in Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2).397 In Hirst,
the European Court of Human Rights considered whether a statute
that disenfranchised convicted prisoners in the United Kingdom
392

Leena Kurki, International Standards for Sentencing and Punishment, in SENTENCING
SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, supra note 77, at 331, 359–60.
393 See Allard, supra note 381, at 228 (arguing that “[t]he present trend of punishing
beyond prison walls through postconviction penalties is incompatible with human
dignity”).
394 This is not to say that that these instruments are without flaws. As commentators
have pointed out, human rights protocols have been hampered by their lack of enforcement mechanisms. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1769 (2008) (noting that “many people have attributed the limited
effects of human rights treaties to the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms” in those
treaties).
395 See ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 14–16 (3d
ed. 2002) (discussing international treaties that set limits on use of death penalty); Richard
C. Dieter, Executive Dir., Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Address at the Ford Foundation
Symposium: The US Death Penalty and International Law: US Compliance with the
Torture and Race Conventions (Nov. 12, 1998), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
us-death-penalty-and-international-law-us-compliance-torture-and-race-conventions (discussing impact of various international conventions and treaties upon legality of death penalty in United States).
396 See, e.g., Kurki, supra note 392, at 369 (arguing that “[s]weeping authorization to
deprive ex-offenders of their right to vote, restrict their ability to obtain jobs and occupational licenses, or deny them social services or welfare benefits might be considered
inhuman or degrading punishment” in violation of various international agreements);
Robin L. Nunn, Comment, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Vote, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L.
763, 781–83 (2005) (arguing that U.S. felon disenfranchisement laws violate Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights).
397 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187; see also supra note 368
and accompanying text.
AND
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violated the European Convention of Human Rights.398 Hirst was
barred by Section Three of The Representation of the People Act
1983 from voting in parliamentary or local elections because he was a
convicted prisoner. He claimed that this statute violated The Convention, arguing that the ban did not serve legitimate punitive ends and
was overly broad and disproportionate because it was “unrelated to
the nature or seriousness of the offence.”399
While the Court recognized that there could be instances where
disenfranchising prisoners would not violate the European
Convention on Human Rights,400 it noted that Hirst was “the first
time that [it] has had occasion to consider a general and automatic
disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners.”401 Although the Court
accepted the Government’s asserted goals of preventing crime and
punishing offenders,402 it rejected the Government’s argument that
the statute only affected individuals “convicted of crimes serious
enough to warrant a custodial sentence.”403 The Court noted that the
disenfranchisement statute applied to a broad cross-section of prisoners, “from one day to life and from relatively minor offences to
offences of the utmost gravity.”404 It further observed that even for
crimes serious enough to warrant imprisonment, disenfranchisement
would hinge “on whether the sentencing judge impose[d] such a sentence or opt[ed] for some other form of sanction, such as a community
sentence.”405 Thus, the Court held that the “general, automatic and
indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important . . . right . . . [was]
incompatible with” the Convention.406
A dignity-based approach to individuals’ post-incarceration lives
would seek to promote, rather than suppress, their standing in the
community. It would aim to restore the individuals, as much as possible, to their prior status, rather than impose broad legal restrictions
398 The provision at issue was Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, which states, “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.” Id. at 203
(citing European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended by Protocol No. 11).
399 Id. at 205.
400 Id. at 212 (suggesting that Convention would not prohibit “restrictions on electoral
rights . . . imposed on an individual who has, for example, seriously abused a public
position or whose conduct threatened to undermine the rule of law or democratic
foundations”).
401 Id. at 211.
402 Id. at 213–14.
403 Id. at 214.
404 Id.
405 Id. at 214–15.
406 Id. at 216.
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that serve to degrade and marginalize them. In doing so, it would aim
to truly reintegrate these individuals into society.
B. Tailor Collateral Consequences to the Underlying Offense
A dignity-based approach to collateral consequences would also
impose only those consequences that directly relate to the underlying
criminal conduct and are therefore necessary to minimize the risk of
further harm. Under this approach, the post-sentence penalties would
be proportionate to the criminal conduct, rather than imposed broadly
on classes of offenders regardless of their specific conduct.
The European Court of Human Rights’ concern in Hirst about
the breadth of the United Kingdom’s disenfranchisement statute thus
reflects a dignity-based approach to collateral consequences. By contrast, collateral consequences in the United States are imposed upon
whole classes of individuals without regard to the magnitude of the
offense committed or the relationship between the underlying criminal conduct and the resulting penalty.407
A dignity-based approach is consistent with the American Bar
Association’s recommendation that collateral consequences not be
imposed upon an individual unless the legislature determines that the
conduct underlying the offense “provides so substantial a basis for
imposing the sanction that [it] cannot reasonably contemplate any
circumstances in which imposing the sanction would not be justified.”408 The ABA defines such consequences as those that “closely
relate[ ] to the offense conduct involved.”409 It offers a few examples
of “closely related” consequences, such as “exclusion of those convicted of sexual abuse from employment involving close contact with
children, loss of public office upon conviction of bribery, denial of
licensure where the offense involves the licensed activity, and prohibition of firearms to those convicted of violent crimes.”410 Such “closely
related” consequences serve a positive public purpose because they
are directly responsive to the harmful conduct and work to minimize
the risk that such conduct will recur.
This focus on linking collateral consequences to specific criminal
conduct can be found in recent employment laws passed in several
American cities and counties. These jurisdictions have implemented
so-called “ban the box” ordinances,411 which remove from city and
407

See supra notes 182–207 and accompanying text.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, § 19-2.2.
409 Id. § 19-2.2 cmt.
410 Id. (footnotes omitted).
411 Jurisdictions that have implemented “ban the box” measures include Austin,
Baltimore, Berkeley, Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New Haven, San Francisco,
408
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county employment applications the question requiring applicants to
disclose whether or not they have a criminal record.412 Jurisdictions
adopting these measures recognize that this question deters individuals from applying for city employment and also prejudices employers
against those applicants who have criminal records from the very
beginning of the application process.413 Instead, in “ban the box”
jurisdictions, all applicants are assessed equally based on their qualifications for the job. An applicant’s criminal background becomes relevant only when he or she has advanced through the process and has
been deemed qualified for the job. At this point, the city or county
conducts a background check, and “a criminal record would only be
relevant if it created an unacceptable risk that the applicant could not
fulfill the job’s requirements.”414 While the factors that these jurisdictions consider regarding the applicant’s criminal record vary slightly,

Alameda County (California), Multnomah County (Oregon), and Travis County (Texas).
NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, MAJOR U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES ADOPT HIRING
POLICIES TO REMOVE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS 1, http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/CityandCountyHiringInitiatives.pdf?nocdn
=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
412 See Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box To Promote Ex-offender
Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 757–58 (2007) (describing “ban the box”
initiatives).
413 There are also several federal and state laws that prohibit employers from discriminating against applicants on the basis of criminal records. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 378-2(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2009) (making it unlawful for employers to discriminate against
potential or existing employees on basis of “court record”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03(1)
(West 2009) (“[N]o person shall be disqualified from public employment, nor shall a
person be disqualified from pursuing . . . or engaging in any occupation for which a license
is required solely . . . because of a . . . conviction,” unless conviction relates directly “to the
position of employment sought or the occupation for which the license is sought.”); N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW § 752(1)–(2) (McKinney 2010) (prohibiting discrimination against applicants for employment or employment-related licenses, or against those who hold license or
employment, on basis of criminal record unless “direct relationship between one or more
of the . . . offenses and the specific license or employment sought . . .” exists); id. § 750(4)
(defining “direct relationship” as criminal conduct having “a direct bearing on [the
person’s] fitness or ability to perform one or more of the duties or responsibilities necessarily related to the license, opportunity, or job in question”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321
(West 2009) (prohibiting employers, labor organizations, and licensing agencies from
“engag[ing] in any act of employment discrimination . . . on the basis of . . . [a] conviction
record”). For a detailed explanation of these laws, see generally O’Brien & Darrow, supra
note 199. However, commentators have noted the difficulties of enforcing these laws. See,
e.g., James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 212 (2008) (“Employers may
actually disqualify job applicants based on a criminal record, but offer other reasons or no
reason at all for having rejected the ex-offender in favor of another job applicant.”).
414 Henry & Jacobs, supra note 412, at 757.
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they all consider the relationship between the record and the requirements of the particular job.415
By limiting collateral consequences to those that are connected to
the underlying offense, these “ban the box” policies are consistent
with a dignity-based approach to collateral consequences.
C. Provide Mechanisms That Allow Individuals with Criminal
Records To Be Relieved of the Legal Penalties That
Accompany a Criminal Record
Jurisdictions in the United States should implement mechanisms
that truly allow individuals to move past their records. Organizations
in the United States have long recognized that expungement and/or
sealing provisions would facilitate reentry by reducing, if not
altogether eliminating, collateral consequences. Efforts began in the
1950s to introduce expungement measures that aimed to minimize the
effects of these consequences.416 These efforts, however, have been
largely unsuccessful.417 Moreover, while some commentators have
championed expungement as a tool to allow individuals to move past
their records,418 others have argued against it, suggesting that
expungement “seeks to rewrite history, establishing that something
did not happen although it really did,”419 and, by essentially erasing
the conviction from public view, “devalue[s] legitimate public safety
concerns.”420
415 See, e.g., CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, CRIMINAL OFFENDER RECORD INFORMATION
(CORI) POLICY § 10 (2007), http://www.cambridgema.gov/purchasing1/CORI_CITY
_POLICY.pdf (considering factors such as “[r]elevance of the crime to the position
sought,” “nature of the work to be performed,” time that has elapsed since conviction, age
of applicant at time of conviction, and “[s]eriousness and specific circumstances of the
offense”). Two commentators have lauded “ban the box” policies’ potential to reform
broader employment practices, observing that “[i]f cities successfully demonstrate that exoffenders can be safely hired for most public-interest jobs, a strong argument will exist for
repealing many de jure restrictions on ex-offender licensing and employment.” Henry &
Jacobs, supra note 412, at 758.
416 For a brief history of these efforts, see Pinard, supra note 41, at 636–37.
417 See Love, supra note 276, at 22 (“[T]he limited and/or uncertain legal effect of
expungement in some jurisdictions, the general unreliability of criminal record systems and
the additional uncertainties introduced by new information-sharing technologies . . . all
combine to raise questions about the usefulness of expungement as a restoration device.”).
418 E.g., Demleitner, supra note 177, at 162 (arguing that expungement would relieve
individuals of collateral consequences).
419 James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 411 (2006). Jacobs observes that “[t]he problem is compounded if the
expungement policy allows or requires lying [by defendants, police officers, or prosecutors]
to support the false history.” Id. Given these problems, he explains, expungement has
traditionally been limited to relatively minor convictions. Id.
420 Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1726 (2003).
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Regardless of the merits of expungement, jurisdictions should
implement practical measures allowing individuals to be relieved of
various collateral consequences. Again, the ABA has recommended
several promising reforms. The ABA’s proposal divides collateral consequences into “collateral sanction[s]” and “discretionary disqualification[s].”421 It defines “collateral sanction” as a “legal penalty,
disability or disadvantage . . . that is imposed on a person automatically upon that person’s conviction.”422 A “discretionary disqualification” is defined as a “penalty, disability or disadvantage, . . . that a
civil court, administrative agency, or official is authorized but not
required to impose on a person convicted of an offense.”423
The ABA proposal offers mechanisms that would allow individuals to be relieved of collateral sanctions or discretionary disqualifications. Specifically, it recommends that courts and/or “specified
administrative bod[ies]” be authorized “to enter an order waiving,
modifying, or granting timely and effective relief from any collateral
sanction imposed by . . . law.”424 It further recommends that state
legislatures “establish a process for obtaining review of, and relief
from, any discretionary disqualification.”425 This approach strikes a
balance that allows individuals to move past collateral consequences
without compromising the broader veracity of public criminal records
and public safety concerns articulated by opponents of expungement.
D. Analyze the Racially Disproportionate Impact
of Collateral Consequences
The United States should draw lessons from Canada, which took
steps in 1996 to ease its disproportionate incarceration of
Aborigines.426 As explained above, African Americans and Latinos,
as well as the relatively few core communities across the United States
to which these individuals return upon release, are uniquely burdened
by collateral consequences.427
A few states have implemented measures in the sentencing context that offer some hope that most states, and perhaps the federal
government, will soon consider the impact of collateral consequences
on people of color. Specifically, Iowa, Connecticut, and Wisconsin
421

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, § 19-1.1.
Id.
423 Id.
424 Id. § 19-2.5(a); see also Jeremy Travis, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY 77 (2005) (arguing “for judicial or administrative
relief if a [collateral] sanction causes undue hardship”).
425 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, § 19-3.2.
426 See supra notes 351–57 and accompanying text.
427 See supra notes 38–44, 337–48 and accompanying text.
422
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have recently taken affirmative steps to address the disproportionate
impact of criminal justice policies on people of color. A study by The
Sentencing Project found that in 2005 Iowa had the highest ratio of
African American to White prisoners in the United States, at nearly
fourteen to one.428 In response to these findings, Iowa enacted legislation in April 2008 that requires that any “propose[d] . . . change in the
law which creates a public offense . . . or changes existing sentencing,
parole or probation procedures” be accompanied by a correctional
impact statement.429 This statement “shall include information concerning . . . the impact of the legislation on minorities.”430
Connecticut, which had the fourth highest ratio of African
American to White prisoners in the United States,431 followed Iowa in
June 2008 by enacting legislation requiring that “a racial and ethnic
impact statement . . . be prepared with respect to certain bills and
amendments that could, if passed, increase or decrease the pretrial or
sentenced population of the correctional facilities in [Connecticut].”432
In 2008, Wisconsin’s governor issued an executive order
“[d]irect[ing] all state agencies with relevant information and capability . . . to develop reporting mechanisms to track traffic citation,
arrest, charging, sentencing and revocation patterns by jurisdiction
and race.”433 The executive order also called for the creation of the
Racial Disparities Oversight Commission, which was to “exercise
oversight and advocacy concerning programs and policies to reduce
disparate treatment of people of color across the spectrum of the
criminal justice system.”434 As in Iowa, the efforts that led to this
executive order began with a national study on racial disparities in the
juvenile justice system. That report found that, in 2003, youth of color
in Wisconsin were ten times more likely to be detained than White
youth—the highest ratio in the country.435 In response to this report,
428 MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE:
STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 10 (2007), available at http://
www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/
rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf.
429 IOWA CODE ANN. § 2.56(1) (West 2010).
430 Id. In addition, the legislation requires the legislative services agency, which is
charged with preparing the correctional impact statements, to “develop a protocol for
analyzing the impact of the legislation on minorities.” Id. § 2.56(5).
431 MAUER & KING, supra note 428, at 10.
432 2008 Conn. Acts 143 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-24b (West
2009)).
433 Wis. Exec. Order No. 251 (2008), available at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/
journal_media_detail.asp?locid=19&prid=3360.
434 Id.
435 NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME:
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 30–31 (2007),
available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2007jan_justice_for_some.pdf.
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Wisconsin’s governor established the Commission on Reducing Racial
Disparities in the Wisconsin Justice System.436 The Commission held
public hearings throughout Wisconsin, studied reports of similar commissions in other states, and reviewed other data.437 Based on the
Commission’s findings and recommendations, the Governor issued
the executive order.438
Thus, a few jurisdictions in the United States have already recognized the extent to which African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system and have
taken steps to assess the extent to which proposed criminal justice policies will exacerbate these disparities. By requiring such analyses,
these states recognize that “policies often have unintended consequences that would be best addressed prior to adoption of new initiatives.”439 However, even in the jurisdictions that have taken the
positive step of focusing on the disproportionate impact of criminal
justice policies, collateral consequences are often ignored. This trend
persists despite the fact that these consequences have dramatically
expanded the reach of the criminal justice system and disproportionately impact the same individuals and communities that are disproportionately affected by the criminal system generally.
Similar studies should examine the extent to which people of
color are disproportionately impacted by collateral consequences
throughout the United States. Federal legislation passed in 2008
required that data on the collateral consequences in all fifty states,
“each territory of the United States, and the District of Columbia” be
studied and compiled.440 This will lead to a more complete understanding of these consequences, which are now extraordinarily difficult to quantify.441 However, fact-finding bodies, such as sentencing
commissions or other government agencies, should also be formed to
study the disproportionate impact of these consequences. These
bodies should be established in each state, with the goal of compiling a
436 See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements: Changing Policies To Address Disparities, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 16, 17–18 (describing history of Wisconsin Executive
Order).
437 Wis. Exec. Order No. 251.
438 Id.
439 Mauer, supra note 436, at 17.
440 Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, 121 Stat. 2534. This
statute directs the Director of the National Institute of Justice to conduct this study. The
Director is required to “identify any provision in the Constitution, statutes or administrative rules of each jurisdiction . . . that imposes collateral sanctions or authorizes the imposition of disqualifications, and any provision that may afford relief from such collateral
sanctions and disqualifications.” Id. § 510.
441 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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thorough state-by-state measure of racial disparities in collateral
consequences.
Moreover, racial and ethnic impact statements, similar to those
that are now required in Iowa, Connecticut, and Wisconsin, should
accompany any proposed expansion of federal or state collateral consequences.442 The statements would recognize and examine any proposed expansion’s racial impact. The analyses set forth in the studies
would provide legislators with the information necessary to fully
weigh the benefits and costs of any proposed change.
CONCLUSION
The record numbers of individuals exiting prisons and jails to
return to communities across the United States is the end result of a
three-decade-long incarceration boom. As they are in all other segments of the U.S. criminal justice system, African Americans and
Latinos are disproportionately represented in the reentering population. Moreover, these individuals are disproportionately returning to
poor, urban communities of color.
Public rhetoric in the United States has long embraced the notion
that a person who completes his or her sentence for a criminal offense
has paid his or her debt to society and is allowed to start anew.
However, the collateral consequences described above, as well as the
countless others that exist at the federal, state, and local levels, prove
that actual practice does not align with this rhetoric. The reality is that
it is nearly impossible for individuals convicted of criminal offenses to
move past their criminal records because collateral consequences
continue to punish them long after the completion of their sentences.
Comparative analyses of collateral consequences should supplement other reform efforts to reduce these penalties. This Article illustrates that individuals with criminal records in the United States, when
measured against similarly situated individuals in England, Canada,
and South Africa, confront unique legal obstacles. Among the chief
lessons gained from comparative analysis is the extent to which the
442 For an argument that racial and ethnic impact statements should be required for any
proposed sentencing legislation, see Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of
Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2007). Mauer
also calls for expanding the use of racial impact statements to collateral penalties. Id. at 44
(“[E]xpanding the use of racial impact statements to other areas of social policy related to
sentencing could help to alleviate the expansion of racial disparities to these collateral
penalties.”).
In addition, a bill has recently been introduced in Oregon that, if passed, will require
that a racial and ethnic impact statement “be prepared for any legislation that may, if
enacted, affect the racial and ethnic composition of the criminal offender population.”
H.B. 2352, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).
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Comparison Countries attempt to preserve the dignity of their
citizens, despite their criminal activity. This is most dramatically exemplified by the ability of individuals in Canada and South Africa to vote
while serving prison sentences. These dignity-enhancing concepts
extend to the post-sentence period, as each of the comparative countries has provisions that pardon or expunge some criminal records
after specific time periods have elapsed.
Federal, state, and local decisionmakers in the United States
should draw on these comparative perspectives to reshape their
approaches to collateral consequences. The overwhelming majority of
incarcerated individuals will be released to families and communities,443 and those who are convicted but not sentenced to incarceration
will immediately confront these consequences. Because of these consequences, convicted individuals will face significant—and, compared
to the other countries considered in this Article, unusually harsh and
permanent—hurdles to reintegration. Federal, state, and local collateral consequences should be retooled to apply only where those consequences directly relate to the individual’s underlying criminal
conduct. The post-sentence transition period should be redesigned to
implement dignity-enhancing measures that provide opportunities for
individuals to move past their criminal records and successfully reintegrate into their communities.

443 E.g., TIMOTHY HUGHES & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REENTRY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/reentry.pdf (estimating that approximately ninetyfive percent of state prisoners will be released).

